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Abstract. We show that higher capital and liquidity ratios increase the efficiency of conventional and 
Islamic banks. Using conditional quantile regressions, we further show that the effect is stronger for highly 
efficient, small, highly liquid, and highly capitalized conventional banks. We also find that more capitalized 
and liquid banks were efficient during the 2008/2009 financial crisis and the Arab Spring. Our findings 
support the view that the constraints imposed by Shari'a law may widen the efficiency gap between the two 
bank types, at the expense of Islamic banks. Furthermore, our findings suggest that the efficiency of 
conventional banks not only depends on bank capital and liquidity, but also on the level of bank efficiency 
while the relationship is inconclusive for Islamic banks. These findings provide insight into how capital 
and liquidity can shape bank efficiency. They suggest that higher capital and liquidity buffers serve a 
constraint on policymakers and may function very differently depending on the level of bank efficiency. 
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Although Shari’a-compliant banks1 account for only 1.5% of total assets in the worldwide banking 
sector (Abedifar et al., 2013; Bitar et al., 2017a), they have experienced tremendous growth over the last 
30 years and currently account for US$1.56 trillion of total assets of the worldwide banking sector (Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), 2018). Moreover, the total assets of Shari’a-compliant financial industry 
has reached a total of US$2.05 trillion in 2017 (IFSB, 2018). The development of this sector can be 
explained by several factors including (i) the oil revenues of the Gulf countries, and (ii) the desire of the 
Muslim world to extend Shari’a laws to all economic activities. The global growth of the Islamic banking 
industry experienced a 4.3% expansion mainly located in Iran, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Malaysia (IFSB, 
2018). In addition, the Islamic banking market share has increased above 20% in several countries, 
reflecting its role as a promising new player along with conventional banks.  
These features raise several concerns about the development of the Islamic banking industry. As a 
result, research has intensified to examine the effects of this sectoral development on bank risk (Zins and 
Weill, 2017), competition (Meslier et al. 2017), financial soundness (Bitar et al. 2017a, b), profitability 
(Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al., 2016), and capital structure (Bitar et al., 2018; Bitar and Tarazi, 
2019). Recent surveys (cf., Song and Oosthuizem, 2014; López-Mejía et al., 2014) show that although 
various countries are improving their legal, regulatory, and supervisory framework regarding Islamic 
banking activities, several challenges in terms of capital and liquidity persist and require further 
investigation. We focus on capital and liquidity because they represent the two main pillars suggested by 
the Basel III guidelines to create a more resilient banking system. While Ashraf et al. (2016) and Zins and 
Weill (2017) examine the effect of Basel II regulation and liquidity ratios on the stability of Islamic banks, 
we investigate the impact of holding higher capital and liquidity on their efficiency.  
Empirical studies have reported mixed findings on the association between banking capital and the 
efficiency of conventional banks. Staub et al. (2010) find that when Brazilian banks hold more capital they 
are more cautious in terms of their risk behavior, which can be channeled into higher efficiency scores. 
Their findings are supported by Banker et al. (2010) and Hsiao et al. (2010) in Korean and Taiwanese 
                                                          
1 This paper does not report the distinguishing characteristics of the Shari’a-compliant banking system. For detailed information 
on this topic, please refer to Khan (2010), Abedifar et al. (2013), and Beck et al. (2013).  
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contexts, respectively. The authors argue that higher capital adequacy ratios reduce banks’ portfolio risk, 
thus leading to safer and better credit risk practices and better performance of the banking system. 
Pessarossi and Weill (2015) also provide evidence of a positive association between capital and efficiency 
for banks operating in China, suggesting that shareholders require less incentive to take action against 
depositors if their stakes in the bank are larger. However, Berger and Di Patti (2006), Altunbas et al. (2007), 
and Lesanovska and Weill (2016) offer different views when examining banks in the US, in fifteen 
European countries, and in the Czech Republic, respectively. While Lesanovska and Weill (2016) find no 
association between capital and efficiency, the former two studies show that low capital ratios diminish 
agency costs and improve efficiency.  
While the research cited above mainly focuses on the impact of capital on conventional bank 
efficiency, the effect of liquidity, which is considered a key novelty in Basel III, has rarely been discussed. 
Vazquez and Federico (2015) and Ashraf et al. (2016) provide evidence that shows that higher liquidity 
ratios improve bank stability in conventional and Islamic banks, respectively. However, the relationship 
between liquidity ratios and bank efficiency has not yet been examined in either bank type. In the 
conventional banking system, risk is channeled from lenders to borrowers while in the Islamic banking 
system, risk is shared between the two. Therefore, guidelines requiring banks to maintain higher liquid 
assets to reduce capital write-off and protect depositors are likely to be less of a concern for Islamic banks 
than for conventional banks.  
Based on the studies reported above, we investigate whether capital and liquidity ratios affect the 
efficiency of conventional versus Islamic banks differently. To do this, we follow Barth et al. (2013) and 
employ two-stage data envelopment analysis (DEA). Specifically, we use an unbalanced panel of 4,123 
bank-year observations over the 2005–2012 period. In a first step, we compute and compare the efficiency 
scores of conventional and Islamic banks following the methodology proposed by Johnes et al. (2014). 
Then, in a second step, we regress our efficiency scores on a series of proxies for capital and liquidity using 
conditional quantile regressions.  
This paper provides empirical and operational contributions to the existing literature. At the 
methodological level, and in contrast to previous studies, we combine two nonparametric approaches, DEA 
and conditional quantile regressions, for two reasons. First, banking institutions are complex organizations 
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and simple ratio analyses cannot capture the complete picture of efficiency for both bank types (Johnes et 
al., 2014; Bitar et al., 2017b).2 As a multifaceted concept, DEA is more effective in capturing bank 
efficiency as it computes efficiency scores by producing a range of outputs from a range of inputs. Second, 
while regulators produce a single set of capital and liquidity guidelines for the entire banking industry 
(including conventional and Islamic banks), we argue that banks need to consider their extant level of 
efficiency. Highly efficient banks may have adequate capital buffers to protect against liquidity stresses in 
the future. Thus, the marginal impact of increasing capital and liquidity on the efficiency of already highly 
efficient banks may be lower than it is for banks of low efficiency. Furthermore, highly efficient banks tend 
to be riskier and may have difficulties in raising capital on short notice. As such, they tend to hold higher 
capital and liquidity ratios than low-efficiency banks, which lowers the benefit of increasing their capital 
and liquidity. For Islamic banks, there are additional institutional factors that should be considered. Riskier 
activities on the asset side can increase liquidity mismatches between long-term investments (e.g. 
Mudharaba and Musharaka Profit Loss Sharing (PLS) contracts) and short term deposits (Zins and Weill, 
2017). In addition, riskier activities are often based on PLS arrangements, which, in contrast to conventional 
banks’ activities, do not require any surplus of capital. Thirdly, depositors or Investment Account Holders 
(IAHs) of Islamic banks agree to share profits and bear losses when they occur. As a result, any form of 
higher capital reserves to protect against liquidity shortages and gain depositors’ confidence should be 
irrelevant under Shari’a law. For all these reasons, if highly efficient Islamic banks have riskier portfolios, 
then higher capital and liquidity ratios might have a different impact on their efficiency compared to 
conventional banks. Consequently, a conditional quantile regression approach is preferable over other 
approaches because it allows for the examination of a nonlinear efficiency relationship.  
At the operational level, this study has important implications for the type of regulation that is 
appropriate for Islamic banks. Recent empirical studies have shown mixed results for the impact of 
regulation on bank risk. While Ashraf et al. (2016) report a positive association between liquidity and 
Islamic banks’ stability, Weill and Zins (2017) find that Basel II penalizes the stability of Islamic banks 
                                                          
2  Another argument is provided by Johnes et al. (2014) who explain that accounting-based profitability and efficiency indicators, 
such as the return on assets, net interest margin, and cost-to-income ratio, are based on bank balance sheets and are often 
exposed to measurement errors due to differences in countries’ accounting standards and on-/off-balance sheet issues. In this 
paper we do not criticize the use of financial ratios but rather argue that one financial indicator cannot capture the full picture 
of bank efficiency. Accordingly, an approach based on DEA is preferable. 
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compared to conventional banks. In this study, we argue that if bank capital and liquidity influence the risk 
of Islamic banks, they will influence their efficiency as well (Lesanovska and Weill, 2016). Specifically, 
we extend previous studies comparing the efficiency of Islamic and conventional banks (Johnes et al., 2014; 
Bitar et al., 2017b) by examining (a) the dependence of efficiency on bank capital and liquidity and (b) how 
this dependence varies for banks with different extant levels of efficiency (using a quantile regression). If 
the higher capital and liquidity ratios imposed by conventional banking regulations are not compatible with 
the specificities of Islamic banks, such regulations might widen the efficiency gap between the two bank 
types at the expense of Islamic banks. This could have a negative effect on economic growth in countries 
where Islamic banks have a large market share. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature, develops the 
hypotheses, and discusses the potentially nonlinear influence of capital and liquidity on bank efficiency. 
Section 3 discusses our methodology, presents the variables, and describes the data set. Section 4 discusses 
the quantitative results, including our descriptive statistics, conditional quantile regressions, and several 
robustness checks. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background 
2.1. Islamic banking and efficiency 
Prior literature on the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks offers different views on whether 
Islamic banks are more or less efficient than conventional banks.  
On one hand, several studies support the view that Islamic banks are likely to be more efficient based 
on four main arguments. First, Islamic banks’ mark-up financing contracts are asset-backed and thus linked 
to the real economy, which makes them less exposed to losses related to speculative activities (derivatives 
and other conventional securities) that caused the 2008 financial crisis. Second, Islamic banks often face 
commercial pressure to pay competitive returns to IAHs to retain existing depositors and attract new ones. 
If return rates are not competitive enough, IAHs can withdraw funds and invest elsewhere. This pressure 
may discipline Islamic banks and make them more efficient (Farooq and Zaheer, 2015). Third, the 
managerial competency of Islamic banks has increased substantially to cover for disadvantages related to 
constraints imposed by Shari’a law. According to Johnes et al. (2014), in recent years, Islamic banks have 
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increased their investment in staff training and in improving public knowledge of Islamic financial 
products. These measures have led to an enhanced reputation, a more positive bank experience, and greater 
demand for their products. Finally, Islamic banks may also be more efficient than conventional banks due 
to macroeconomic factors. For instance, Bitar et al. (2017b) suggest that oil revenues, the rapid economic 
development through the private banking sectors, the opening up of the banking sector to foreign 
competition, and the newly adopted financial reforms (in some countries) put pressure on Islamic banks. 
This pressure can be translated into new financial products and more spending on research and 
development, as well as on employee training to ensure efficiency in allocating resources and to enhance 
productivity.  
On the other hand, various studies have argued that Islamic banks are less efficient than conventional 
banks for four main reasons. First, the reliance on the real economy can put Islamic banks at a disadvantage 
if financial distress hits the real economy (Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013). For instance, Nakheel. the property 
development arm of the investment company Dubai World, announced the rescheduling of more than $4 
billion of Islamic banks’ Sukuks, which could have triggered a crisis for the Islamic banking system if 
Nakheel had faced bankruptcy. This incidence led Standard and Poor’s “Islamic Finance Outlook” (2017) 
to question Islamic banks’ dependency on real estate. Second, Shari’a law places constraints on investments 
and on several tools of risk management (Abedifaret al., 2013), and some Islamic banking products are not 
standardized (rather, they are tailor-made to fit specific clients). Johnes et al. (2014) argue that these factors 
generate greater administrative and operational costs. Furthermore, the development of Islamic banking 
products tends to be time consuming, as products require approval by the Shari’a board. Third, Islamic 
banks are often exposed to double regulatory standards. They not only need to comply with international 
regulations, such as the Basel Accords, but also with the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the 
Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) regulatory frameworks, 
which could increase the costs of their compliance at the expense of their efficiency scores (Bitar et al., 
2017b). Finally, because they are smaller and less experienced, Islamic banks are less capable of benefiting 
from economies of scale than their conventional counterparts (Beck et al., 2013). 
In the empirical literature, studies that compare the performance of conventional and Islamic banks 
often use profitability measures (Mollah and Zaman, 2015; Mollah et al., 2016) or efficiency measures 
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(Beck et al., 2013; Johnes et al., 2014; Bitar et al., 2017b). In this review we focus on the three studies that 
examine the association between Islamic banks and efficiency, as they are more relevant to the present 
study. 
Beck et al. (2013) employ various proxies of bank efficiency to compare 510 conventional and Islamic 
banks in 22 countries over the period 1999–2009. These indicators include the cost to income ratio, the 
overheads to assets ratio, and the loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio. Their findings vary substantially 
across countries. However, overall they show that Islamic banks are less cost-efficient and have higher 
intermediation costs than their conventional peers. They further show that large Islamic banks incur greater 
costs than large conventional banks. The authors interpret their findings based on the complexity of some 
Islamic banking products and on Islamic banks’ young age compared to conventional banks. 
While Beck et al. (2013) use accounting measures to proxy for bank efficiency, Johnes et al. (2014) 
use meta-frontier analysis to compute efficiency scores for conventional and Islamic banks. Their study 
covers 255 banks operating in countries where at least 60% of the population is Muslim. Their approach 
consists of computing a common efficiency frontier for the two bank types as well as two separate efficiency 
frontiers, one for each bank type. While the common frontier’s results represent the operational business 
model, the specific frontiers’ results represent the managerial competence of managers of the two bank 
types. Their results provide evidence that Islamic banks are less efficient than conventional banks when 
using a common frontier but more efficient when using specific efficiency frontiers. The authors explain 
this result by arguing that the operational business model puts Islamic banks at a disadvantage compared 
to conventional banks, but that the managers of Islamic banks make up for this disadvantage by improving 
their skills and enhancing public knowledge of their products. 
Bitar et al. (2017b) use factors extracted from principal component analysis to assess the financial 
soundness of Islamic banks. They consider a sample of banks in 33 countries during the period 1999 to 
2013. In comparison with the two previous studies, they construct an efficiency factor based on 
combinations of different efficiency measures to compare the two bank types. Their findings show that 
Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional banks. Specifically, they find that when banks are 
operating in a hybrid legal system or a more religious country, listed and mature Islamic banks are more 
efficient than their conventional counterparts. According to the authors, different factors can explain these 
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findings. First, scale economies and activity diversification along with market discipline, strong monitoring, 
and supervision can explain the superior efficiency of mature and listed Islamic banks compared to 
conventional banks that meet these criteria. Second, in more religious countries and in countries with a 
hybrid legal system, Islamic banks are better recognized by the government and the general public 
(compared to how they are perceived in other countries). This recognition enables these banks to easily 
access the market, obtain resources, and sell Shari’a-compliant products. It also helps Islamic banks to 
avoid costs related to simultaneous compliance with different regulatory standards.  
To summarize, the differences between the two bank types provide arguments in support of either 
higher or lower efficiency for Islamic banks compared to conventional banks. While Beck et al. (2013) find 
that Islamic banks are less efficient, Johnes et al. (2014) and Bitar et al. (2017b) show that Islamic banks 
are more efficient, due to internal factors, such as managerial skills, and external ones, such as market 
discipline and recognition by the government and general public. 
2.2. Tested hypotheses 
We propose four different hypotheses regarding the effect of higher capital and liquidity ratios on the 
efficiency of Islamic banks.  
The first hypothesis (H.1) suggests that capital ratios negatively affect the efficiency of Islamic banks. 
The hypothesis relates to the fact that Islamic banks have to comply with Shari’a law and thus have a 
specific profile of deposits (Zins and Weill, 2017). For instance, Islamic banks use investment accounts in 
which depositors share profits with their banks but also bear losses when they occur. According to Shari’a 
law, IAHs are treated like investors, and thus protection of their initial capital and returns is not required. 
Such an arrangement can increase the moral hazard behavior of the managers of Islamic banks. These 
managers may seek more investment deposits, which provide them with leverage to engage in riskier 
activities – by relying on Mudharaba and Musharaka PLS contracts – and generate higher profits to satisfy 
shareholders at the expense of IAHs who bear any potential losses (Bitar et al., 2017b). This implicit 
agreement yields higher profits for shareholders while improving the reputation, salaries, and bonuses of 
the managers of Islamic banks. In other words, the investment accounts of Islamic banks may be used as 
leverage to maximize bank profits at the expense of bank IAHs and the bank’s capital position.  
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The second hypothesis (H.2) posits that capital ratios positively affect the efficiency of Islamic banks 
because at a practical level, Islamic banks often operate in dual banking systems and share the same market 
as conventional banks. Therefore, Islamic banks cannot always channel losses to IAHs because the latter 
might withdraw their funds, causing liquidity and solvency problems. To avoid potential losses and liquidity 
stress, they prefer to use mark-up based activities, such as Muraraba and Ijara contracts, instead of PLS 
contracts and tend to hold higher capital ratios (Zins and Weill, 2017). In addition, Islamic banks tend to 
compete with conventional banks by offering a competitive return on investments to IAHs, compared to 
the interest rates proposed by conventional banks, using their profit-smoothing reserves3 or by displacing 
their commercial risk.4 In so doing, Islamic banks can channel retained earnings from these reserves or 
capital to remunerate IAHs and thus maintain their confidence. There are two important implications for 
the efficiency of Islamic banks. First, increased returns on investment accounts attract more deposits and 
thus increase potential investments. Second, increased returns on Islamic bank investments (return on 
assets) can help the banks to build up additional reserves and capital, which can offset future losses. This 
practice can be used to attract more deposits by signaling a strong monitoring incentive to IAHs, since 
higher solvency ratios force banks to internalize the costs of their defaults. In addition, enhanced monitoring 
and screening of potential projects can be reflected in lower expectations of the projects’ default, thus 
improving efficiency.  
The subprime crisis shows that liquidity also plays a critical role in maintaining a resilient banking 
system, alongside capital requirements. Housa (2013) argues that liquidity buffers are likely to have an 
important impact on the funding structure and profitability of banks. Likewise, Altunbas et al. (2007) 
contend that liquidity is positively associated with the efficiency of conventional banks.  
The third hypothesis (H.3) is that higher liquidity ratios negatively affect the efficiency of Islamic 
banks. Islamic banks face several challenges regarding their funding structure because of the Shari’a 
                                                          
3 Profit Equalization Reserves (PER) are used to reduce or neutralize the profit payout fluctuations on investment deposits and 
by extension to create profit rates that are aligned with market rates of return on conventional deposits. Islamic banks can also 
use the Investment Risk Reserves (IRR) to cover losses that might occur from time to time and to grant a minimum level of 
return to their IAHs. 
4 Islamic banks can transfer the risk that arises from investments managed on behalf of IAHs to their own capital by adjusting 
the shareholders’ share of profits. Such a situation often occurs when the IAHs’ funds are invested in projects based on long 
term Murabaha or Ijara contracts at profit rates that no longer meet current market expectations. It could also occur due to 
market risk and credit risk where the Islamic bank intervenes to protect IAHs’ returns from the poor performance of assets 
under its management (IFSB, 2005, p. 19). 
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constraints imposed on their business model. For instance, Islamic banks lack a cross-border Islamic 
interbank money market (Abdullah, 2010) and short-term Shari’a-compliant liquidity instruments (Čihák 
and Hesse, 2010). They also cannot benefit from short-term financing provided by central banks (Beck et 
al., 2013) and cannot channel any liquidity surplus to conventional banks (Akhtar et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
Abdullah (2010) notes that “in some countries … the legal framework for public debt and financing 
arrangements does not explicitly allow for the design and issuance of Islamic financial instruments” (p. 14). 
Therefore, Islamic banks possess higher liquidity buffers to protect against their weak liquidity 
infrastructure (Zins and Weill, 2017). In this respect, Hassan and Dridi (2010) argue that Islamic banks 
should be prudent when considering the Basel liquidity requirements, as the liquidity management of these 
banks is in its infancy. In addition, Rajhi (2013) explains that Islamic banks possess higher amounts of 
liquidity simply because they are inefficient at managing their own resources. Accordingly, Shari’a 
constraints may put Islamic banks at a disadvantage relative to their conventional counterparts and may 
have a negative effect on their efficiency.   
Conversely, the fourth hypothesis (H.4) suggests that liquidity ratios are positively associated with 
the efficiency of Islamic banks. These banks may be advised to hold higher liquidity buffers and to engage 
in short term investments that reflect their liability side (Zins and Weill, 2017). Given that Shari’a law 
prohibits Islamic banks from relying on derivatives and hedging instruments, holding higher liquidity ratios 
can be important, especially in stress situations (to avoid liquidity problems) and even more so in cases 
where there is a high withdrawal risk.  In addition, depositors as well as investors prefer to deal with banks 
that have a healthy ratio of liquid assets to deposits, as argued by Belanes and Hassiki (2012) and Johnes 
et al. (2014). Therefore, more efficient banks tend to hold higher liquidity ratios that can serve as a security 
mechanism to protect against capital write offs, expensive fire sales, and sudden needs to raise costly equity, 
which could negatively affect their efficiency scores.  
Overall, the four hypotheses mirror the identity crisis faced by the Islamic banking industry. One 
might expect that under Shari’a law, PLS instruments—as the core of Islamic banking and finance—would 
dominate the activities of Islamic banks. However, non-PLS modes of finance, such as Murabaha and Ijara, 
predominate and these can require Islamic banks to hold higher capital and liquidity ratios instead of 
engaging in profitable activities. In addition, critics of Islamic banks argue that their practices raise doubts 
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about their compliance with Shari’a law (Khan, 2010; Beck et al., 2013) and view their products simply as 
conventional products adapted or modified to be compliant with Islamic law. Having similar products to 
those of conventional banks places Islamic banks in competition with their conventional counterparts, 
forcing them to use smoothing reserves to reduce the risk of withdrawal and avoid liquidity stress. In 
addition, constraints imposed by Shari’a law may increase the opportunity cost of not using funds in 
projects that are more profitable. Finally, a different scenario to that described above may be expected for 
highly efficient Islamic banks that are more likely to engage in PLS activities. That scenario implies that 
higher capital and liquidity ratios would widen the efficiency gap between the two bank types. Table 1 
presents a brief literature review and reports the four hypotheses on the impact of capital and liquidity on 
the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks.  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
2.3. Capital, liquidity, and the level of bank efficiency 
Examining how the impact of capital and liquidity ratios on bank efficiency varies with the extant 
degree of bank efficiency has important policy implications. Regulators set capital and liquidity guidelines 
as a whole for the entire banking industry (including conventional and Islamic banks), without considering 
a bank’s level of efficiency. Highly efficient banks may react differently to capital and liquidity ratios than 
less efficient ones for two reasons, resulting in two opposing hypotheses. First, highly efficient banks might 
hold less capital because being highly efficient provides them with the buffers needed to increase their 
capital in the future (Fiordelisi et al., 2011) and thus to avoid any liquidity problems (Zins and Weill, 2017), 
which could also explain why regulators may be more flexible with these banks in terms of capital 
requirements. Second, highly efficient banks may need to be highly capitalized and highly liquid because 
of their high risk (employed to maximize their profits), which may make it difficult for them to raise capital 
on short notice. In this case, regulators push banks to increase their capital with the amount of risk taken 
(Bitar et al., 2017b), while banks themselves prefer to hold additional capital ratios above the minimum 
capital requirements to avoid both regulatory sanctions and any costs associated with issuing fresh equity 
(Fiordelisi et al., 2011). In the case of Islamic banks, riskier activities in terms of investments in PLS 
contracts, such as Mudharaba and Musharaka, do not require any additional capital and liquidity to protect 
against liquidity exposures or to gain depositors’ confidence. Therefore, if highly efficient Islamic banks 
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have riskier portfolios, they may react differently to higher capital and liquidity than conventional banks. 
In the following sections, we explain the quantile regression methodology, which allows us to examine the 
potentially nonlinear effect of capital and liquidity on bank efficiency. 
3. Data and methodology  
3.1. Data 
Our data derive from five main sources. First, we obtained bank-level financial characteristics for an 
unbalanced sample of 4,123 bank-year observations (3,380 bank-year observations for conventional banks 
and 743 bank-year observations for Islamic banks) for twenty-eight countries5 from 2005 to 2012 using the 
Bankscope database of Bureau Van Djik. For the sample construction, we followed the comparative 
literature on conventional and Islamic banks (Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al. 2013; Bitar et al. 2019). Our 
original sample includes 33 countries. We removed countries like Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cayman Islands, Oman, and Senegal because they do not have available information on at least two out of 
the three measures of capital, i.e., Tier 1 capital and capital adequacy. Banks without at least three 
continuous observations were excluded.  In addition, we removed countries with data for fewer than four 
banks (Beck et al. 2013) as well as banks with negative regulatory ratios (Bitar et al. 2019). Second, we 
used the 2012 World Development Indicators database to control for macroeconomic conditions and 
financial development. Third, we manually collected information on capital adequacy and Tier 1 capital 
ratios from the annual reports and financial statements of Islamic banks (for which the information is not 
available in the Bankscope database). Fourth, we accessed the Pew Research Center and the World Fact 
Book to retrieve information about the legal system in each country. Finally, data on the Arab Spring were 
compiled from a previous study by Bitar et al. (2017b). 
3.2. Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
We use DEA for several reasons. As discussed in the introduction, bank efficiency is a multifaceted 
concept and cannot easily be examined using simple ratio analyses (Johnes et al., 2014). Second, DEA is a 
nonparametric technique and does not require any distributional form of the error term, which makes it 
                                                          
5 Specifically, our sample covers the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, 
Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mauritania, the Maldives, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, the Philippines, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Yemen.  
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more flexible than other performance measures employed in traditional regression analysis (Johnes et al., 
2014; Mollah and Zaman, 2015). Finally, DEA frontiers allow banks to have different objectives, as each 
bank is compared only with banks of similar inputs and outputs.  
We follow Johnes et al. (2014) and Bitar et al. (2017b) and compare conventional and Islamic banks 
with their own efficiency frontiers.6 The efficiency scores are estimated separately for each year (Johnes et 
al., 2014). Ceteris paribus, Sufian (2010) argues that polling data separately for each year is important in 
estimating efficiency scores for two reasons. First, in contrast to regressions, DEA efficiency scores reflect 
yearly observations for each bank and assume that each bank optimizes its own productivity. Second, 
because the banking environment is dynamic, a bank might be efficient in the first year but inefficient in 
the following year. Hence, a yearly best-practice frontier might reveal significant changes over time. 
Similar concerns may arise on a country level. However, we do not pool our data for each country because 
the rules under which Islamic banks (i.e., Shari’a principles) and conventional banks work are the same 
regardless of location. To construct the DEA efficiency frontier of conventional and Islamic banks, we 
consider an input-oriented technique rather than an output-oriented technique because banks are cost-
minimizing institutions whose outputs are normally determined by external demand and other external 
factors that banking institutions cannot control. In addition, we use an input-oriented DEA with variable 
returns to scale, as proposed by Banker et al. (1984), to measure pure technical efficiency (PTE). While 
some of the empirical literature uses cost and profit efficiency to proxy for bank efficiency (Berger and Di 
Patti, 2006; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Pessarossi and Weill, 2015), technical efficiency is often used when 
studying banking regulations (Barth et al. 2013, Ayadi et al. 2016) and when comparing conventional and 
Islamic banks (Johnes et al. 2014; Bitar et al. 2017b).  Profit efficiency, which is a measure based on input-
cost and output-revenue, might be more appropriate for studies that focus on conventional banks where the 
underlying objective is profit maximization. In contrast, the main objective of Islamic banks is unlikely to 
be cost minimization or profit maximization (Johnes et al. 2014; Bitar et al. 2017b).  
                                                          
6 We argue that in contrast to conventional banks, Islamic banks are not only motivated by cost minimization and profit 
maximization, but rather that these banks endorse social values and ethical behaviour. Therefore, as long as Islamic banks are 
viewed to some extent as different in terms of their objectives and activities, a specific efficiency frontier for each bank type 
can be seen as more appropriate than a common efficiency frontier. More details about the distinguishing characteristics of 
specific versus common frontiers can be found in previous works, such as Johnes et al. (2014) and Bitar et al. (2017b). 
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3.3. DEA input–output definition  
The choice of inputs versus outputs is under debate in the efficiency literature.7 We employ a series 
of inputs and outputs as in previous studies. The inputs are: deposits and short-term funding (Hsiao et al., 
2010; Belanes and Hassiki, 2012; Barth et al., 2013; Johnes et al., 2014), fixed assets (Sufian, 2010; Johnes 
et al., 2014), overhead as a proxy for general and administrative expenses, and loan loss provisions as a 
proxy of risk (Barth et al., 2013). With regards to the last input, we note that the efficiency literature is 
divided on the incorporation of loan loss provisions versus equity to control for a bank’s risk exposure. On 
one hand, Johnes et al. (2014) propose using equity as an indicator of risk taking. They argue that data on 
loan loss provisions are more difficult to collect and may reduce the sample size because of data 
unavailability. On the other hand, Beck et al. (2013) point out that risk can be incorporated by including 
loan loss provisions in efficiency analyses. Ultimately, because of concerns about mixing flow and stock 
factors in bank inputs, we compute efficiency scores using three alternative input measures to control for 
bank risk.8 The outputs are: total loans (Hsiao et al., 2010; Staub et al., 2010; Barth et al., 2013; Johnes et 
al., 2014), other earning assets (Barth et al., 2013), and other operating income. Barth et al. (2013) argue 
that an important reason for including other operating income is to avoid penalizing banks that largely rely 
on nontraditional activities in their investment portfolio.  
3.4. Conditional quantile regressions 
Our sample covers 28 countries with heterogeneous characteristics. For example, small countries such 
as Lebanon and the Maldives are listed together with big countries such as the United Kingdom. Our sample 
is similar in its composition to the samples used by Andini and Andini (2014) in the sense that the sample 
countries have different levels of economic growth, legal systems, and degrees of oil dependence. 
Consequently, multiple linear regressions, such as OLS or GLS, that assume that standard errors are 
normally distributed do not hold in our study because our proxy for bank efficiency and many of our 
independent variables are not normally distributed (Andini and Andini, 2014). Looking at the unconditional 
distribution of bank efficiency scores in Figure 1 and the distribution of standard errors in Figure 2, there 
                                                          
7 Descriptive statistics for banks’ inputs and outputs are available from the authors upon request. 
8 The three methods of controlling for bank risk among the inputs are: (i) including loan loss provisions, as mentioned above, 
(ii) replacing loan loss provisions with total equity, and (iii) not including any control for risk. The regression results are highly 
consistent across the three approaches. 
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is clear evidence that our dependent variable does not follow a normal distribution. In Figure 1, the solid 
green line illustrates the normal distribution while the dashed red line represents the distribution of the 
efficiency proxy, which is not normally distributed. The Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q) plot (Figure 2) also shows 
significant deviation of the standard errors from the straight horizontal line, indicating that standard errors 
likewise do not follow a normal distribution. In addition to these two graphical illustrations, we perform a 
series of statistical tests. The Kolmogorov–Smirnov test for normality suggests that normality is rejected 
for our proxy of bank efficiency; the p-values for efficiency scores are less than 0.01. Cramer–von Mises 
and Anderson Darling tests report similar results. In addition, we compute the Jarque–Bera test for 
normality, which asymptotically approaches the χ2 distribution with two degrees of freedom and performs 
well with large data (number of observations > 2,000). We find that our efficiency proxy has a critical value 
of  𝜒0.05,2
2 = 5.99, thus confirming the graphical results that our efficiency scores are not normally 
distributed. 
While previous studies focus on the mean value of the efficiency distribution, conditional quantile 
regressions estimate a whole set of quantile functions providing a richer description of the heterogeneous 
relationship among capital, liquidity, and bank efficiency (highly efficient versus less efficient). We follow 
Andini and Andini (2014) and use the quantile regression approach proposed by Koenker and Basset 
(1978). Conditional quantile regressions represent a generalization of median regression to other quantiles 
of the response variable (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). This approach is more robust to outliers and 
distributions with heavy tails. In addition, it helps avoid the restrictive assumption that the error terms are 
identically distributed at all points of the conditional distribution. The baseline quantile regression is given 
by: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽0 + 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑡   𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜃(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡, 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
′ 𝛽0                                                                 (1) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  is a measure of the pure technical efficiency of bank i in country j in year t. This variable is 
calculated by estimating the efficiency scores relative to each bank category’s own efficiency frontier to 
ensure the robustness of our results (Johnes et al., 2014). In other words, Islamic (conventional) banks are 
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compared to their own benchmark (i.e., the most efficient Islamic (conventional) banks in a given year).9  
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
′  is a vector of exogenous variables, 𝛽0 is the vector of coefficients to be estimated, and  is a vector of 
residuals.  𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝜃(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡) denotes the 𝜃
𝑡ℎ conditional quantile of 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 given 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡. The 𝜃th regression 






















           
(2) 
where 𝜌𝜃(∙), which is known as the ‘check function’, is defined as: 
𝜌𝜃( 𝑖𝑗𝑡) = {
𝜃 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑡                     𝑖𝑓𝜃 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑡 ≥ 0
(𝜃 − 1) 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑡        𝑖𝑓 𝜃𝑖𝑗𝑡 < 0 
}                                                                                          (3) 
Accordingly, Equation (2) below is resolved using a linear programming approach. Following Buchinsky 
(1998), as one increases 𝜃 continuously from 0 to 1, one marks the entire conditional distribution of 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
conditional on 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡.
10 
  𝑄(𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝑥
′(𝐂𝐀𝐏, 𝐋𝐈𝐐, 𝐁𝐂, 𝐂𝐂)𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                                     (4) 
The exogenous vector 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡
′  include four groups: (i) capital and liquidity variables (CAP and LIQ), (ii) bank-
level variables (BC), (iii) country-level variables including macroeconomic factors (CC), and (iv) 
interactions, cross-sectional, and time-series fixed-effect variables. 
3.5. Capital, liquidity, and other control variables 
As noted above, the vectors CAP and LIQ represent bank capital and liquidity ratios. The main 
methodological difference between our study and the prior literature on banking regulations is that we use 
                                                          
9 Efficiency scores are also estimated relative to a common frontier that includes conventional and Islamic banks. The results are 
presented in section 4.3.4. However, this comparison gives an advantage to conventional banks as they are far more developed 
than Islamic banks (Johnes et al. 2014; Bitar et al. 2017b). 
10 We used the sqreq module of Stata 14.2 to run simultaneous conditional quantile regressions using a sample covering the 
period between 2005 and 2012 for a panel of 28 countries.  
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bank-level variables instead of aggregate, country, and time-invariant measures of capital and liquidity. For 
instance, Barth et al. (2013) use time-invariant regulatory variables, which represent a critical limitation. 
Therefore, we collect bank-level data that cover 28 countries from 2005 to 2012. Our data set incorporates 
six main ratios to proxy for the impact of higher capital and liquidity on the efficiency of both bank types. 
We refer to the Bankscope database and consider the capital adequacy ratio, which is computed as Tier 1 
capital plus Tier 2 capital divided by risk-weighted assets and off-balance-sheet exposures. We also 
consider the Tier 1 capital ratio, which is calculated as the sum of shareholders’ funds and perpetual, 
noncumulative preference shares divided by risk-weighted assets and off-balance-sheet exposures. An 
important difference between the traditional (Basel) capital ratios and both capital adequacy and Tier 1 
capital ratios is that Basel regulatory guidelines closely relate the level of bank capital to the underlying 
risk a bank faces, where the risk assessment is carried out by the bank itself. This self-assessment by banks 
may create incentives for banks to hide their real exposure to risk and to provide untruthful information 
about their capital adequacy position (Blum, 2008). In addition to the two capital risk-based measures 
mentioned above, we use the shareholders’ equity ratio computed by dividing bank equity base by total 
assets (Abedifar et al., 2013; Vazquez and Federico, 2015).11 As for liquidity, we use three ratios. The first 
is the maturity match ratio computed by dividing a bank’s liquid assets by its deposits and short-term 
funding. A higher value means a bank is more liquid. The second ratio is the ratio of liquid assets to assets. 
One important feature of this ratio is that it provides a quick picture of the proportion of liquidity available 
to pay for short-term obligations. Therefore, the ratio of liquid assets to assets is an indicator of bank 
liquidity. The third measure is the ratio of liquid assets to total deposits and short-term borrowing, which 
provides a general view of a bank’s liquidity position by considering the amount of liquid assets available 
for borrowing in addition to deposits.   
BC is the vector of bank portfolio characteristics. We control for bank size using the natural logarithm 
of total assets (Barth et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013). We also use tangibility computed as the ratio of fixed 
assets to assets and activity diversification computed by dividing net loans by total earning assets (Abedifar 
et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013). Finally, we investigate whether costs are positively or negatively associated 
                                                          
11 Recent literature shows that the complexity of risk-weighted assets methodology could underestimate bank true risk exposure. 
To avoid any potential untruthful assessment related to the calculation of risk-weighted assets and by extension the bank’s actual 
level of capital, we follow Bitar et al. (2016) and use a non-risk-based equity to assets ratio to further check the robustness of 
our results. 
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with bank efficiency by employing the cost-to-income ratio, CIR. We anticipate that higher costs are 
negatively associated with bank efficiency (Beck et al., 2013).  
CC is a vector of country-level variables used to control for macroeconomic conditions. We use the 
logarithm of GDP per capita and GDP growth to measure economic development. For instance, a higher 
value of GDP growth reflects higher financial stability (Anginer et al., 2014; Vasquez and Federico, 2015). 
We also use the inflation rate, Inflation. Kasman and Yildirim (2006) show that higher inflation may create 
incentives for banks to compete through excessive branch networks. Lee and Hsieh (2013) argue that with 
higher inflation rates, banks tend to charge customers more, resulting in higher interest rates and bank 
profits. However, such behavior might be followed by less demand for loans and more expensive loan 
reimbursement, leading to higher default rates (Koopman et al., 2009). Boyd et al. (2001) consider inflation 
a signal for an undeveloped market and banking system. Our last variable, following Abedifar et al. (2013) 
and Bitar et al. (2017b), is a measure of legal systems, Legal, which controls for the degree of religiosity.  
In addition, we include country-year dummy variables to control for time and country heterogeneity. 
Finally, we follow Anginer et al. (2014) and Bitar et al. (2017b) and cluster at the bank level for two reasons. 
First, some countries have a much larger number of observations than other countries in the sample. Second, 
we only have twenty-eight countries. Therefore, clustering at the country level might create biased results. 
All explanatory variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the effect of outliers. 
Definitions and data sources for all variables are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 Panel A shows that, on average, Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional banks 
thus confirming earlier findings by Johnes et al. (2014) and Bitar et al. (2017b). While the former explain 
the superiority of Islamic banks by a higher level of managerial competency, the latter attribute it to their 
greater involvement in low-risk governmental infrastructure projects. Table 2 Panel A also shows that 
Islamic banks are more capitalized and more liquid than conventional banks (although in the case of 
liquidity, this result does not hold true for all liquidity ratios).12 For example, the Tier 1 capital ratio differs 
                                                          
12 See Table A2 in the Appendix for a correlation matrix for our variables. 
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significantly with a mean value of 27.83% for Islamic banks and 16.92% for conventional banks. The 
maturity match ratio has a mean of 74.99% for Islamic banks and 49.47% for conventional banks. The 
higher capital and liquidity ratios for Islamic banks can be partly explained by the weak Islamic interbank 
money market, the prohibition of derivatives and debt instruments, and the absence of a lender of last resort, 
leading Islamic banks to hold larger capital and liquidity reserves (Zins and Weill, 2017). Another reason 
for holding higher capital ratios is the desire to smooth the profits of investment account holders to reduce 
the risk of withdrawals and avoid liquidity mismatches (Bitar et al., 2017a). Regardless of the bank type, 
we notice that the capital ratios of banks in our sample largely exceed the minimum capital requirements 
imposed by the Basel III Accord. Finally, the t-tests and Wilcoxon rank tests confirm the significant 
differences in capital and liquidity between the two bank types.  
As for the control variables, the results show that conventional banks are larger but have lower 
tangible assets than Islamic banks, which is in line with previous studies (Beck et al., 2013; Bitar et al., 
2017b; Zins and Weill, 2017). The ratio of net loans to total earning assets shows that Islamic banks engage 
in traditional financing activities to a greater extent than do conventional banks, reflecting the constraints 
imposed by Shari’a law regarding investments in other earning assets (Abedifar et al., 2013). The cost to 
income ratio shows that Islamic banks have higher costs than conventional banks because they are younger 
and less experienced and thus cannot benefit from economies of scale. Moreover, Islamic banks invest more 
in screening and monitoring of some of their PLS activities, such as Mudharaba and Musharaka, to reduce 
their clients’ morally hazardous behavior. In addition, Shari’a law prohibits many of the facilities available 
to conventional banks, such as using derivatives, debt, and hedging instruments. Finally, Table 2, Panel B 
presents the number of conventional and Islamic banks across 28 countries.  
[Insert Table 2 around here] 
4.2. Main results  
As shown in the previous section, our univariate tests suggest that there are significant differences in 
the efficiency, capital, and liquidity of conventional versus Islamic banks. In this section,13 we first compare 
                                                          
13 We also estimate the regression for the 5th, 10th, 90th, and 95th quantiles. We obtain similar results but do not present them 
here due to the relatively small number of observations in these quantiles.   
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the efficiency of conventional and Islamic banks, after which we examine the impact of higher capital and 
liquidity ratios on the efficiency of the two bank types. To do this, we use an Islamic bank dummy variable, 
Islamic, which equals 1 for Islamic banks and 0 for conventional banks, to capture efficiency differences 
between the two bank types. We also interact Islamic with the capital and liquidity ratios to examine their 
effect on the efficiency of Islamic banks using the following equation:  
𝑄(𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝜑 × 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜗 × 𝐂𝐀𝐏_𝐋𝐈𝐐𝐢𝐣𝐭 +  𝜗
∗ × 𝐂𝐀𝐏_𝐋𝐈𝐐𝐢𝐣𝐭 × 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖  
+ 𝛽 × 𝐁𝐂𝐢𝐣𝐭 + 𝛾 × 𝐂𝐂𝐣𝐭 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗 × 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  
𝑁
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
+ 𝑖𝑗𝑡      
(5) 
First, we examine the relation between capital ratios and the efficiency of Islamic and conventional 
banks. Table 3, Panel A shows that, in the capital ratio model, Islamic banks are more efficient than 
conventional banks at the 1% significance level across all quantiles when using a specific efficiency frontier 
for each bank type. These results are similar to those obtained by Johnes et al. (2014) and Bitar et al. (2017b) 
but different from those provided by Beck et al. (2013). As for the impact of capital ratios on the efficiency 
of Islamic and conventional banks, our findings in Panel A show that higher capital ratios (both risk-based 
capital ratios and traditional capital ratios) have a significant positive effect on the efficiency of 
conventional banks (ϑCAP is positive and significant). This effect of capital is also positive (but less 
pronounced) for Islamic banks ([ϑCAP + ϑinter
∗ ] is positive and significant). The findings suggest that the 
capital effect is stronger for highly efficient conventional banks (Models 3, 6, and 9) while we observe no 
consistent trend in the capital effect across the efficiency quantiles of Islamic banks. A Wald test confirms 
the significant differences for the effect of capital ratios on the lower and upper quantile of the efficiency 
distribution of conventional banks but suggests no significant difference across quantiles for Islamic 
banks.14  
Overall, the findings in Panel A support our second hypothesis suggesting that, for Islamic banks, 
higher capital ratios reduce displaced commercial risk by affording banks the opportunity to offer 
competitive rates by smoothing IAHs’ returns. In addition, higher capital ratios can be considered as a 
                                                          
14 Some tests report non-available (N/A) results because Stata does not perform the Wald test and the linear combination test 
when the number of observations in the lower and the upper quantile of the efficiency distribution is not equal. 
21 
credible monitoring incentive not only to assure IAHs, but also to attract new depositors. Furthermore, 
higher capital ratios can enable Islamic banks to build up additional reserves to deal with future default and 
to issue new equity at a lower cost. As for the stronger capital effect on highly efficient conventional banks, 
we interpret this finding as indicating that these banks may have riskier portfolios or are more likely in need 
of raising capital on short notice (which can be costly) and thus prefer to hold higher capital ratios to avoid 
equity costs and regulatory sanctions. For Islamic banks, a risky portfolio means greater reliance on 
Mudharaba and Musharaka PLS contracts, and thus the capital effect (and, by extension, the need to raise 
additional capital) is less important, as depositors share profits and losses with Islamic banks. Finally, 
despite the positive effect of capital on the efficiency scores of Islamic banks, this effect appears to be less 
prominent than it is for conventional banks. This implies that higher capital ratios enlarge the efficiency 
gap between the two systems, especially for highly efficient banks. The less pronounced effect may be 
related to the fact that holding higher capital ratios does not affect Islamic banks as strongly because they 
share profits and losses with depositors and thus capital is no longer essential to protect depositors. The 
weaker effect may also result from the way banks compute their capital ratios. Zins and Weill (2017) argue 
that Basel II may not influence Islamic banks because risk-weighted asset methodologies consider the risks 
of only conventional banks. Finally, in many countries Islamic banks may be exposed to double regulatory 
standards. For instance, they may have to comply with regulatory guidelines imposed by the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) but also with Basel guidelines, which could increase their compliance costs at the 
expense of their efficiency scores relative to their conventional counterparts (Bitar et al., 2017b). 
[Insert Table 3 around here] 
Table 3, Panel B corroborates the results of Panel A in showing that Islamic banks are more efficient 
than conventional banks at the 1% significance level across all quantiles when using a specific efficiency 
frontier for each bank type. As for the effect of liquidity ratios on the efficiency of Islamic and conventional 
banks, Panel B shows that higher liquidity ratios have a significant, positive effect on the efficiency of 
conventional banks (ϑLIQ is positive and significant in six out of nine models) and a positive but less 
pronounced effect on the efficiency of Islamic banks ([ϑLIQ + ϑinter
∗ ] is positive and significant but only in 
models 1 to 3). In addition, we find that the liquidity effect is stronger for highly efficient conventional 
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banks (Models 3, 6, and 9) but there is no consistent trend across the efficiency quantiles of Islamic banks. 
The Wald test shows a marginally significant difference between the effect of liquidity ratios on the lower 
and upper quantile of the efficiency distribution of conventional banks, but no difference for Islamic banks.  
Overall, these findings lend support to the fourth hypothesis by showing that higher liquidity ratios 
help avoid liquidity mismatches especially since Shari’a law imposes a severe constraint on the liquidity 
risk management of Islamic banks. These banks lack a powerful Islamic interbank money market. They 
have limitations regarding the development of short-term financing instruments and are not allowed to deal 
with debt instruments and derivatives. In addition, Islamic banks suffer from a disparity in standards and 
accounting methods (IFSB and AAOIFI regulatory guidelines versus Basel guidelines). For these reasons, 
they are motivated to hold higher liquidity ratios, which can help them resist liquidity shortage  and isolate 
them from the externalities of the financial crisis at the same time, which, in turn, can be translated into 
higher efficiency scores. However, the liquidity effect is less pronounced for Islamic banks than for 
conventional banks, suggesting that higher liquidity ratios widen the efficiency gap between the two bank 
types. While the constraints imposed by Islamic law on Islamic banks can explain their higher liquidity 
ratios, inefficiency in managing resources could be another reason for maintaining higher liquidity buffers. 
If Islamic banks are unable to engage in profitable long term projects because they rely on short term 
financing and cannot benefit from debt instruments, then the opportunity cost of holding liquidity buffers 
is higher and may have a penalizing effect on their efficiency scores.  
As for the control variables, bank size shows that larger banks are more efficient, which is thought to 
result from economies of scale, experience, and reputation (Beck et al., 2013; Bitar et al., 2017b). We also 
find that tangible assets have a negative impact on bank efficiency. Therefore, a higher share of non-earning 
assets on bank balance sheets decreases efficiency scores because of the opportunity cost that arises from 
investing in fixed assets instead of loans, derivatives, and other types of securities. Moreover, we find that 
a higher proportion of net loans to total earning assets could harm the efficiency of a bank. This harm could 
be explained by these banks’ weak credit risk management or their higher dependence on loan/financing 
activities instead of on investments in other types of earning assets. Finally, bank cost clearly shows that 
higher cost reduces bank efficiency at successive quantiles and for all models. Bitar et al. (2017a) explain 
that the inability to control operating expenses has a negative influence on bank efficiency. As for 
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macroeconomic conditions, we find that GDP growth is positively associated with bank efficiency, whereas 
GDP per capita and inflation are rarely significant. In sum, economic growth improves banks’ efficiency. 
Our results are consistent with the findings of Johnes et al. (2014) and Bitar et al. (2017b). 
4.3. Robustness checks 
4.3.1. The role of bank size  
To provide some additional insight, we explore whether the impact of bank capital and liquidity 
differs between small and large banks. While Beck et al. (2013) and Bitar et al. (2017a) find that the 
financial soundness of Islamic banks can vary depending on bank size, Zins and Weill (2017) report no 
significant difference for the impact of Basel II on Islamic bank risk between small and large banks. To 
shed additional light on this issue, we split our sample of Islamic and conventional banks according to the 
median15 of the logarithm of total assets in each bank category. Similar to Eq. (5), we include the same 
bank16 and country-level characteristics in addition to country-year fixed effects. Employing conditional 
quantile regressions, the results in Table 4, Panel A suggest that, in general, higher capital ratios have a 
significantly positive effect on the efficiency of small conventional banks (𝜗𝐶𝐴𝑃 is positive and significant) 
and a positive but less pronounced effect on the efficiency of small Islamic banks ([ϑCAP + ϑinter
∗ ] is 
positive and significant). We also observe a positive and significant effect on large Islamic banks, but only 
at the lowest efficiency quantile. Furthermore, the effect of capital on the efficiency of both bank types 
appears to be stronger for small banks than for large ones. Finally, for small banks, we find that the capital 
effect is stronger for highly efficient conventional banks than highly efficient Islamic banks (Model 6) but 
shows no consistent trend across the efficiency quantiles of Islamic banks. We explain these findings by 
the fact that small banks cannot benefit from governmental bailouts and from lenders of last resort in the 
same fashion as large and systemically important banks. Smaller banks hold higher capital ratios because 
they are less recognized and reputable and thus may experience difficulties in raising new equity during 
periods of financial stress (Zins and Weill, 2017). In addition, they cannot benefit from economies of scale 
and diversification (Abedifar et al., 2013). Small banks may also be more prudent in their investment 
                                                          
15 Based on the median value of each bank category, Islamic banks are classified as small banks when LnTA ≤ 14.0650 and as 
large banks when LnTA > 14.0650. Likewise, conventional commercial banks are considered small when LnTA ≤ 14.4783 
and large when LnTA > 14.4783.  
16 We split Islamic and conventional banks according to their asset size; thus, we no longer control for LnTA in Table 4. 
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decisions because they tend to be younger and less experienced than large banks, which could explain the 
positive effect of capital on their efficiency scores. The same arguments also apply to small Islamic banks. 
In addition, Islamic banks engage in profit smoothing mechanisms to provide IAHs with competitive 
returns, which could explain the strong positive effect of capital on the lower and medium quantile of the 
efficiency distribution of capital (on the lower and medium efficiency quantiles of small Islamic banks and 
on the low efficiency quantile of large Islamic banks). In other words, less efficient Islamic banks are likely 
to use their capital reserves to smooth IAHs’ returns to reduce the risk of withdrawal and to sustain 
competition with conventional banks, which could be translated into higher efficiency scores. As for the 
efficiency gap, it seems to be driven mainly by small conventional and Islamic banks. Small and highly 
efficient Islamic banks may decide to engage more in PLS activities. In addition, these banks cannot 
compute their own risk-weighted assets using internal rating (Zins and Weill, 2017). This methodology is 
often used by large banks, which can afford its costs and the complexity of its application. Finally, small 
Islamic banks are more exposed to the costs related to double regulatory standards than large Islamic banks, 
for which the regulatory authorities tend to be more flexible in terms of enforcing capital requirements.  
[Insert Table 4 around here] 
As for liquidity, Table 4, Panel B suggests that liquidity increases the efficiency of small conventional 
and Islamic banks, although this positive effect is only significant when using the maturity match ratio for 
Islamic banks. The findings also suggest that the liquidity effect is stronger for highly efficient, small 
conventional banks (Models 11 and 12). On one hand, small banks are often more exposed to liquidity 
mismatches, have less access to interbank money markets, and cannot benefit from lenders of last resort. 
Small Islamic banks, on the other hand, need to hold additional reserves to smooth IAH returns and prevent 
sudden withdrawals. Yet, holding higher liquidity ratios can also be interpreted as poor liquidity 
management and can increase the opportunity cost since holding higher liquidity buffers reduces 
opportunities for engaging in profitable investment projects. This can explain the insignificant effect of the 
remaining two liquidity ratios on the efficiency of small Islamic banks. It can also explain the efficiency 
gap resulting from small Islamic banks holding higher liquidity ratios. 
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4.3.2. High liquidity versus low liquidity and high capitalization versus low capitalization banks 
We split the sample into high liquidity and low liquidity banks according to the median of the maturity 
match ratio17 to examine whether the association between capital and efficiency of the two bank types is 
driven by either of these subgroups. Table 5, Panel A shows that at successive quantiles, capital ratios are 
positively associated with the efficiency of highly liquid conventional banks (Models 1–3). However, when 
we examine conventional banks with low liquidity, we observe a positive effect only for the upper quantile 
of the efficiency distribution (Model 6). As for Islamic banks, higher liquidity ratios show a positive effect 
on the efficiency of highly liquid Islamic banks, but this effect is only seen when using the shareholders’ 
equity ratio and less pronounced than the equivalent effect for conventional banks. These findings are 
similar to those of Berger et al. (2016) who refer to a risk absorption theory where highly capitalized 
conventional banks are more liquid. In addition, Weill and Zins (2017) explain that Islamic banks tend to 
hold higher capital ratios to overcome liquidity stress and reduce withdrawal risk. This could partially 
explain the more pronounced effect of capital ratios on the efficiency of highly liquid conventional and 
Islamic banks along with the fact that capital is a credible monitoring incentive that serves not only to assure 
IAHs, but also to attract new depositors. 
To check the robustness of the findings in Table 5, Panel A, we split the sample into banks of high 
and low capitalization according to the median of the shareholders’ equity ratio18 and examine whether the 
association between the liquidity and efficiency of Islamic banks is driven by either of these subgroups. 
Panel B shows that liquidity is positively associated with the efficiency of highly capitalized conventional 
banks. The same result is obtained for highly capitalized Islamic banks, but the effect is less pronounced. 
In addition, the Wald test continues to provide evidence of significant differences between the effect of 
capital ratios on the lower and upper quantile of the efficiency distribution of conventional banks. 
                                                          
17 Based on the median value of each bank category, Islamic banks are classified as having low liquidity when the maturity match 
ratio is ≤ 33.95 and as being highly liquid when the maturity match ratio is > 33.95. Likewise, conventional commercial banks 
are considered as having low liquidity when the maturity match ratio is ≤ 33.88 and as being highly liquid when the maturity 
match ratio is > 33.88. 
18 Islamic banks are classified as having low capitalization when the shareholders’ equity ratio is ≤ 15.82 and as highly capitalized 
when the shareholders’ equity ratio is > 15.82. Likewise, conventional commercial banks are considered as having low 
capitalization when the shareholders’ equity ratio is ≤ 10.84 and high capitalization when the shareholders’ equity ratio is > 
33.88. 
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In brief, the findings in Panels A and B suggest that highly liquid and highly capitalized banks have 
a stronger effect on efficiency, although this effect tends to be less pronounced for Islamic banks.  
[Insert Table 5 around here] 
4.3.3. The effect of higher capital and liquidity on the efficiency of Islamic banks during the financial crisis 
and the Arab Spring 
As further evidence, we now examine the effect of holding higher capital and liquidity ratios on the 
efficiency of Islamic banks during the global financial crisis and the Arab Spring distress period. To do 
this, we develop the following quantile regression model, shown in the first instance for the global financial 
crisis period:  
𝑄(𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡|𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖𝑗𝑡)
= 𝛼 + 𝜑 × 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝜗 × 𝐂𝐀𝐏_𝐋𝐈𝐐𝐢𝐣𝐭 + 𝜗
∗ × 𝐂𝐀𝐏_𝐋𝐈𝐐𝐢𝐣𝐭 × 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖 + ∅
∗ × 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿
+ ∅∗′ × 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖 × 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿 + 𝜑
∗ × 𝐂𝐀𝐏_𝐋𝐈𝐐𝐢𝐣𝐭 × 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿 + 𝜑
∗′ × 𝐂𝐀𝐏_𝐋𝐈𝐐𝐢𝐣𝐭
× 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿 × 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽 × 𝐁𝐂𝐢𝐣𝐭 + 𝛾 × 𝐂𝐂𝐣𝐭 + ∑ 𝛿𝑗 × 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  
𝑁
𝑗=1
+  𝑖𝑗𝑡              (6) 
Anginer et al. (2014) use data from Laeven and Valencia (2008) to examine the relationship between 
bank capital and risk in the crisis period. However, after examining an updated version of Valencia and 
Laeven’s (2012) data on banking crisis periods, we find only a small number of countries in our sample 
that were reported as being affected between 2005 and 2012. Therefore, we decide to follow Abedifar et al. 
(2013) and Beck et al. (2013) instead and consider 2008–2009 as the global financial crisis period. We add 
a crisis dummy, GLOBAL, which equals 1 for the period 2008–2009, and 0 otherwise. We interact GLOBAL 
with Islamic, with CAP_LIQ, and with both variables simultaneously (𝐶𝐴𝑃_𝐿𝐼𝑄 × 𝐺𝐿𝑂𝐵𝐴𝐿 × 𝐼𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑐). 
We investigate whether Islamic banks were more efficient during the global financial crisis as well as 
whether the effect of holding higher capital and liquidity ratios on their efficiency scores remains the same. 
The results in Table 6, Panels A and B show that both Islamic and conventional banks were less efficient 
during the global crisis (∅∗ and ∅∗ + ∅∗′ are negative and significant in both the capital and liquidity 
models). The two panels also respectively show that more capitalized and more liquid conventional banks 
were more efficient during the global subprime crisis (𝜗 + 𝜑∗ is positive and significant). The effect of 
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capital and liquidity also appears to be positive and significant for Islamic banks during the crisis period, 
especially when using the shareholders’ equity and the maturity match ratios (𝜗 + 𝜑∗ + 𝜑∗′ is positive and 
significant). It thus appears that higher capital and liquidity ratios helped both bank types to be more 
efficient during the subprime crisis, as also shown in other studies (Beck et al., 2013; Bitar et al., 2017a). 
Finally, we notice that the positive effect of bank capital is stronger for high-efficiency (as opposed to low-
efficiency) conventional banks while the differential effect across efficiency quantiles for Islamic banks is 
inconclusive.  
[Insert Table 6 around here] 
In a second step, we examine whether the results persist during the Arab Spring. Following Ghosh 
(2016) and Bitar et al. (2016), we invoke a dummy variable, Arab spring, which equals 1 if a country was 
severely affected by the Arab Spring, and 0 otherwise.19 This variable replaces GLOBAL in Equation (6). 
The findings, reported in Table 7, Panels A and B, show that the Arab Spring does not have a significant 
effect on the efficiency of the two bank types (∅∗ and ∅∗ + ∅∗′ are insignificant in both the capital and 
liquidity models). The results in both panels continue to show that more capitalized and more liquid 
conventional banks are more efficient when replacing the global subprime crisis with the Arab Spring (𝜗 +
𝜑∗ is positive and significant). The effect of capital and liquidity also appears to be positive and significant 
for Islamic banks during the Arab Spring when using the shareholders’ equity and the maturity match ratios 
(𝜗 + 𝜑∗ + 𝜑∗′ is positive and significant). Therefore, banks with higher capital and liquidity ratios appear 
to be more efficient not only in periods of financial distress, but also in periods of political distress.   
[Insert Table 7 around here] 
4.3.4. Alternative risk factors in bank inputs 
As an additional sensitivity test, we replace loan loss provisions with total equity to control for risk 
in bank inputs (Johnes et al., 2014; Bitar et al., 2017b). The results in Table 8 (Models 1–3) are consistent 
                                                          
19 We define the Arab Spring as the period of political distress, revolutions, and armed rebellions that resulted in severe economic 
and financial instability in the Arab world. 
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with those in prior tables. Capital ratios and liquidity ratios are positively associated with the efficiency of 
conventional banks. This effect is also positive (although less pronounced) for Islamic banks.  
In a second step, we exclude total equity from the bank inputs because some may argue that equity is 
already considered part of bank capital and thus cannot be included in both the dependent and independent 
variables. As a result, we no longer control for the risk measure in the bank inputs. Employing conditional 
quantile regressions, Table 8 (Models 4–6) shows that the results remain significant. For instance, capital 
adequacy and shareholders’ equity ratios have a positive effect on the efficiency of conventional banks. 
The effect of these variables on the efficiency of Islamic banks is also positive. As for liquidity, the three 
proxies show a positive effect on the efficiency of conventional banks at successive quantiles (Models 4–
6). Liquidity ratios also have a positive effect on the efficiency of Islamic banks. While capital and liquidity 
ratios tend to have a stronger effect on high-efficiency (as opposed to low-efficiency) conventional banks, 
there is no consistent trend across the efficiency quantiles for Islamic banks. The Wald test confirms these 
findings, indicating a significantly different effect of some capital and liquidity ratios between the lower 
and upper quantile of the efficiency distribution of conventional banks, but there is no such difference for 
Islamic banks. The finding that the effects of capital and liquidity are weaker for highly efficient Islamic 
banks than for highly efficient conventional banks once again confirms the presence of an efficiency gap 
at the expense of Islamic banks, at least for banks in the highest efficiency quantile.  
[Insert Table 8 around here] 
4.3.5. Excluding developed countries 
Another important concern is that our sample includes Islamic banks operating in advanced 
economies, such as the United Kingdom and Singapore. For instance, one may argue that the United 
Kingdom and Singapore are international financial centers and differ widely from the other countries in our 
sample. This difference is important given that DEA efficiency scores are sensitive to outliers. Accordingly, 
banks in these countries may be heterogeneous and different in terms of their business model, regulation, 
and supervision compared to banks in the rest of the developing world. Therefore, we first exclude the 
United Kingdom from our sample and re-compute efficiency scores for both conventional and Islamic 
banks. In a second step, in addition to the United Kingdom, we exclude Singapore and re-compute the 
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efficiency scores. Our results are presented in Table 8 (Models 7–12) and show even more robust findings. 
Higher capital and liquidity ratios are positively associated with the efficiency of conventional banks, 
especially highly efficient ones. The effects of capital and liquidity are also positive for Islamic banks, 
although there is no conclusive evidence of a differential effect across the efficiency quantiles.20 
4.4. Other estimation techniques  
4.4.1. Capital and liquidity changes  
Since we study the effect of capital and liquidity on the efficiency of Islamic banks, it would be 
interesting to examine how temporal changes in capital and liquidity can affect changes in Islamic banks’ 
efficiency. For instance, Barth et al. (2013) suggest that a bank’s efficiency level can be affected by changes 
in regulatory reforms. We refer to Barth et al. (2013) and study changes in capital and liquidity ratios 
because Islamic banks are often more capitalized and more liquid than their conventional counterparts. 
Therefore, it is important to study the effect of year-to-year changes in capital and liquidity buffers in 
addition to the effect of their absolute values on efficiency. We use first-difference estimation with year-
to-year changes (corresponding to the sample period) for all dependent and independent variables. We 
delete 2005 from the sample because it lacks sufficient observations. We also lose several bank-year 
observations because of the first-difference estimation. As a result, the final sample contains observations 
for six of eight years.  
The findings, presented in Table 9 (Models 1–3), provide several new insights. First, in almost all 
models, Islamic banks are not significantly different from their conventional counterparts in terms of year-
to-year efficiency changes, suggesting that one bank type is actually following or mimicking the financial 
performance of the other type. Second, while changes in capital and liquidity ratios continue to show a 
positive effect on conventional bank efficiency changes, the same changes appear to have no significant 
effect on efficiency changes for Islamic banks. For conventional banks, the changes in capital requirements 
are likely to represent the passage from Basel I to Basel II and more recently to the Basel III capital 
guidelines. These changes appear to have a strong positive effect on the efficiency changes of conventional 
                                                          
20 In comparison with the rest of our sample, where Islamic banks operate in a dual banking system, Iran and Sudan have a fully 
compliant Shari’a banking system. Therefore, in addition to excluding developed countries, we also excluded two developing 
countries, i.e., Iran and Sudan to further ensure the robustness of our findings. The results remain unchanged and further confirm 
our previous findings. This point has been brought to our attention thankfully by one of the referees. 
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banks. For Islamic banks, however, changes in capital guidelines do not seem to have a significant effect 
on efficiency changes. While Basel capital guidelines are explicitly designed for conventional banks, 
Islamic banks often take time to adapt these guidelines to account for some of their specificities. In addition, 
the IFSB often publishes specific and adapted guidelines for Islamic banks following every new guideline 
published by the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (BCBS). These publications could explain 
the insignificant effect of capital changes on the efficiency changes of Islamic banks. Finally, changes in 
capital ratios appear to widen the efficiency gap between the two bank types by favoring conventional 
banks over Islamic ones.  
As for liquidity ratios, we find little evidence that changes in liquidity ratios are associated with 
changes in efficiency scores. This lack of correlation can be explained as follows: (i) in contrast to the 
capital ratio reforms imposed by Basel I and Basel II, the regulatory authorities did not exert any mandatory 
guidelines that required banks to increase their liquidity ratios;21 thus, the liquidity ratios for both bank 
types remained constant during the studied period; and (ii) Basel III is the first guideline to require banks 
to hold liquidity buffers. However, these new liquidity buffers are being implemented in the period between 
2015 and 2021, a period that we do not cover in this study.  
[Insert Table 9 around here]    
4.4.2. Alternative regression analysis 
As additional sensitivity tests, Table 9 (Models 4–6) employs three alternative econometric 
specifications and standard error corrections. First, we use truncated regressions to address any biases 
related to the upper and lower distribution of observations for the dependent variable. We also correct for 
the heteroscedasticity of standard errors using a White procedure. Second, we employ a random effect, 
generalized least squares (GLS) regression and use two methods for correcting standard errors: i) a 
bootstrapping technique with a random resample of 100 banks from our main sample, and ii) clustering 
standard errors at the bank level. Importantly, the estimated coefficients on capital and liquidity load 
positively and significantly on the efficiency scores of the two bank types in almost all estimations and 
                                                          
21 Basel III implemented the liquidity coverage ratio in January 2015 and the net stable funding ratio in January 2018. As for 
Islamic banks, only a guidance principle on liquidity risk management was implemented in 2013. 
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models; however, this positive effect is more pronounced for conventional banks than for Islamic ones, 
indicating that our main results are unaffected by the use of different estimation techniques.  
4.4.3. Additional and alternative control variables and instrumental variable approach 
We complement our analysis and address the issue of potentially omitted variables by including a 
series of macro variables in our models. We refer to Barth et al. (2013) and use regulatory requirements, 
capital stringency, overall supervisory power, average tenure of supervisors, and strength of external audit 
to control for regulation, supervision, and monitoring. In addition, we add two variables to represent (i) the 
total percentage banking share of the three largest banks in a country, and (ii) the Islamic banking share in 
a country. The results in Table 10 (Models 1–3) show that almost all explanatory variables maintain their 
signs and significance. Furthermore, the Wald test shows that the significant difference between the effect 
of capital and liquidity ratios on the lower and the upper quantiles of the efficiency distributions of 
conventional banks remains unchanged.  
[Insert Table 10 around here] 
We also control for possible endogeneity concerns by emphasizing the important role of the 
regulatory environment when examining the impact of capital and liquidity on the efficiency of Islamic 
banks. To address the endogeneity concern, we use: (i) lagged values of the capital and liquidity ratios, and 
(ii) an instrumental variables (IV) approach, which consists of two-stage regressions. 
The literature reports mixed views regarding the use of lagged (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Anginer 
and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2014) versus non-lagged (Banker et al., 2010; Hsiao et al., 2010; Barth et al., 2013) 
independent variables to examine the impact of banking regulation on bank risk and performance. In a first 
step, we hypothesize that capital and liquidity ratios may take one year to show their pronounced effect. In 
addition, a one-year lag of capital and liquidity reduces any concerns about endogeneity. Therefore, we lag 
our capital and liquidity ratios by one year to examine the robustness of our results. Table 10 (Models 4–
6) reports similar results, thereby confirming our earlier findings.  
The second method of dealing with endogeneity involves using an IV approach. First, IV regresses 
each of our six proxies of the capital and liquidity ratios on our instruments and on the other regressors 
reported in the baseline models. Second, the predicted values of the various capital and liquidity ratios 
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replace these ratios in the baseline models. In this study, we use the Freedom House’s economic 
environment for the media index and Djankov et al’s (2007) creditor rights index as instruments for the 
three capital ratios. We use the Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions of Polity IV project’s 
durability of political regimes measure and Ashraf et al.’s (2016) leverage ratio as instruments for the three 
liquidity ratios. We use these measures because they capture the institutional environment, which plays a 
key role in shaping the financial development of economies. Moreover, we argue that it is unlikely that any 
of these measures has a direct effect on banking efficiency today. Instead, they may affect bank performance 
through their impact on banking capital and liquidity.  
We follow Barth et al. (2009) and conduct an F-test of the excluded exogenous variables in the first-
stage regressions. The null hypothesis of the test is that our instrument does not explain cross-sectional 
differences in regulatory capital guidelines and measures. We reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level in 
almost all models. The results of the first-stage regressions generally show that our instruments are good 
determinants of the capital and liquidity ratios. The results of the second-stage regressions are reported in 
Table 10. We use different estimation techniques. In Model 7 we use a two-stage least squares regression, 
and in Model 8 we use the generalized method of moments. Both the Sargan and Hansen’s J tests of 
overidentifying restrictions are statistically insignificant, suggesting that the instruments are valid in both 
estimations. The second-stage regression results show clear evidence of a positive and significant 
association among capital, liquidity, and bank efficiency in almost all models and across different 
estimation techniques. The same effect is also positive but less pronounced for the efficiency of Islamic 
banks. These results provide additional support for our earlier findings and suggest that our findings are not 
driven by endogeneity.  
4.4.4. Computing efficiency scores based on a common frontier  
Johnes et al. (2014) and Bitar et al. (2017b) find that Islamic banks are more efficient than 
conventional banks only when each bank type is compared to its own specific efficiency frontier. In this 
subsection, we re-compute efficiency scores using a common frontier for the two bank types and examine 
whether Islamic banks are more efficient than conventional banks.22 Defenders of the common frontier 
                                                          
22 The results for the higher efficiency scores of one bank type over the other type can be affected by the choice of a common or 
a specific efficiency frontier. We are grateful to one of the referees for bringing this point to our attention. 
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approach argue that Islamic banks compete with conventional banks and thus have similar customers. In 
addition, many conventional banks have recently opened Islamic windows or subsidiaries and offer some 
Islamic banking products, suggesting that both bank types are similar, especially in a competitive 
environment. The results are presented in Table 11 and show the following: Firstly, Islamic banks are not 
significantly more efficient than conventional banks, except at the upper quantile of the efficiency 
distribution. This finding is in line with Johnes et al. (2014) and Bitar et al. (2017b) who argue that a 
common frontier comparison cannot distinguish between managerial incompetence and the rules under 
which a bank operates (conventional or Shari’a) as sources of inefficiency, which could explain the 
insignificant results. A specific frontier comparison, however, makes it possible to distinguish between the 
effects of managerial competence and the operational business model on bank efficiency. Accordingly, the 
fact that the result changes from being insignificant (with a common frontier) to being in favor of Islamic 
banks (with specific frontiers), suggest that the managers of Islamic banks are particularly efficient, in terms 
of skills and knowledge mobilization of their products, given the rules by which they are constrained. 
Secondly, capital and liquidity ratios are positively associated with the efficiency of conventional banks, 
especially highly efficient ones. Thirdly, capital and liquidity are positively associated with the efficiency 
of Islamic banks. Fourthly, the capital effect appears to be most pronounced for the lower quantile of the 
efficiency distribution of Islamic banks, while for conventional banks, it is most pronounced for the upper 
quantile of the efficiency distribution. Finally, the results remain unchanged after excluding the UK and 
Singapore from the sample. 
[Insert Table 11 around here] 
5. Conclusions  
We have explored the effect of holding higher capital and liquidity ratios on the efficiency of 
conventional and Islamic banks, as well as whether this effect differs between less efficient and more 
efficient banks using conditional quantile regressions. Our results suggest that capital and liquidity ratios 
are positively associated with the extant efficiency of the two bank types. However, this positive effect 
appears to be less pronounced for Islamic banks, indicating that higher capital and liquidity ratios widen 
the efficiency gap between the two bank types in favor of conventional banks. Furthermore, a quantile 
regression approach suggests a nonlinear effect of capital and liquidity on bank efficiency; the efficiency 
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gap tends to widen at the upper tail of the efficiency distribution. We consequently support the view that 
the effect of capital and liquidity depends not only on the bank type, but also on the level of bank efficiency. 
Finally, our results suggest that more capitalized and more liquid banks were also more efficient during the 
global financial crisis and the Arab Spring. Our results are robust when using first-difference conditional 
quantile regressions, an IV approach, and other estimation techniques.  
Our findings reflect the nature of Islamic banks’ business model and their novelty as a new player in 
the banking industry. Islamic banks can benefit from depositors’ investment accounts to engage in risky 
PLS or mark-up financing activities. As a result, they prefer to hold higher capital ratios in addition to 
smoothing reserves in case of project default. They also tend to hold higher liquidity ratios to avoid liquidity 
mismatches between long-term investments and weak short-term debt (financing) infrastructure due to 
constraints imposed by Shari’a law. These specific features can be translated into more prudent investment 
decisions and greater monitoring incentives to reduce the risk of withdrawal and assure competitive returns 
to investment account holders, which could explain the positive effect on their efficiency. This conclusion 
stands for small, highly liquid, and highly capitalized Islamic banks. While Zins and Weill (2017) conclude 
that Basel II widened the risk gap between conventional and Islamic banks in favor of the former, our 
findings add to the debate by showing that higher capital and liquidity ratios extend the efficiency gap 
between the two bank types. It appears that the tendency for Islamic banks to hold significant buffers of 
capital and liquidity results from their specificities in term of PLS activities and constraints imposed by 
Shari'a law. These constraints can enlarge the efficiency gap with respect to their conventional peers due 
to the opportunity cost that arises from not using their funds in projects that are more profitable.  
This study has three important implications for the ongoing debate between regulators and policy 
makers on the development of the Islamic banking industry. First, higher capital and liquidity ratios increase 
the efficiency of conventional banks more than they increase the efficiency of Islamic banks, especially 
when both bank types are already highly efficient. This situation could put Islamic banks at a disadvantage 
in countries with a strong reliance on Basel capital and liquidity requirements. Second, imposing higher 
capital and liquidity ratios could reduce the overall bank efficiency and economic growth in countries where 
the Islamic banking sector is considered too big to be ignored. Third, capital and liquidity effects are more 
pronounced for highly efficient banks, which imply a complex relationship between capital and liquidity 
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on one hand and the level of bank efficiency on the other. Finally, while the literature argues that banking 
regulations improve conventional banks’ efficiency, Islamic regulatory organizations should use Islamic 
financial principles and concepts to create their own set of ratios rather than following the traditional 
banking regulations. However, we do not call upon Islamic banks to escape existent regulations; rather we 
believe that adapted capital and liquidity guidelines proposed by the IFSB are welcomed and can serve as 
a cornerstone for more detailed guidelines that not only consider the particularities of Islamic banks, but 
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Brief literature review (and hypotheses) on the effect of capital and liquidity on bank efficiency  
Reported empirical literature on conventional banks (and prediction on Islamic banks) Results (expected) 
Panel A: Capital ratios and bank efficiency   
Berger and Di Patti (2006); Altunbas et al. (2007); Goddard et al. (2010) Capital ratios negatively affect the 
efficiency of conventional banks  
Fiordelisi et al. (2011); Chortareasa et al. (2012); Staub et al. (2010); Banker et al. (2010); 
Barth et al. (2013); Pasiouras et al. (2015) 
Capital ratios positively affect the 
efficiency of conventional banks  
Islamic banks need to comply with the Shari’a law; they have a specific target of 
depositors; managers benefit from PLS arrangements; they engage in riskier activities; they 
prefer higher leverage (less capital) to increase efficiency  
H.1: Capital ratios negatively affect the 
efficiency of Islamic banks  
Islamic banks use mark-up activities instead of PLS activities; they possess reserves to 
smooth profits and provide competitive profit rates to their customers; they build-up 
additional capital buffers to improve their efficiency  
H.2: Capital ratios positively affect the 
efficiency of Islamic banks  
Panel B: Liquidity ratios and bank efficiency 
Altunbas et al. (2007); Johnes et al. (2014); Belans and Hassiki, 2012; Chortareasa et al. 
(2012) 
Liquidity ratios positively affect the 
efficiency of conventional banks  
Islamic banks face liquidity challenges related to constraints imposed by the Shari’a law; 
they have weak liquidity instruments and weak interbank money market which could be 
negatively associated with their efficiency 
H.3: Liquidity ratios negatively affect the 
efficiency of Islamic banks  
Islamic banks are advised to hold higher liquidity buffers and to engage in short-term 
investments; they are prohibited from dealing with debt and derivative instruments; 
liquidity buffers serve as a security mechanism and an indicator of a healthy liquidity 
situation for depositors, which could be positively associated with their efficiency 
H.4: Liquidity ratios positively affect the 




Table 2  















Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on the efficiency of commercial and Islamic banks, a series of capital and liquidity ratios, and various bank- and 
country-level variables. Our sample contains 4,123 bank-year observations for the period from 2005 to 2012. Efficiency (loan loss provision) denotes efficiency 
scores calculated relative to each bank’s specific efficiency frontier where loan loss provisions are used as a risk factor; Efficiency (no control for risk) denotes 
banks’ efficiency scores calculated relative to each bank’s specific efficiency frontier where the risk factor is excluded from the efficiency inputs; Efficiency (total 
equity) denotes efficiency scores calculated relative to each bank’s specific efficiency frontier where total equity are is used as a risk factor; Tier1 capital represents 
the Basel II Tier1 regulatory ratio. This ratio is calculated by dividing a bank’s Tier1 capital ratio by its risk weighted assets; Capital adequacy is the total capital 
ratio, also called the capital adequacy ratio. This ratio is calculated by dividing a bank’s Tier1 and Tier2 capital ratio by its risk weighted assets; Shareholders’ 
equity is the equity to assets traditional non-risk based capital ratio; Maturity match is the ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding. It represents the 
liquidity of a banking institution; Liquid assets to assets is the ratio of liquid assets to assets. It reports the amount of liquid assets available and therefore the 
liquidity position of a banking institution; Liquid assets to total deposits is similar to Maturity match and is computed by dividing a bank’s liquid assets by its total 
deposits and borrowing; Size is the logarithm of total assets; Tangibility is the ratio of fixed assets over total assets; Activity diversification is the ratio of net loans 
over total earning assets; ROAA is the return on average assets ratio; CIR is the cost to income ratio; OVERTA is the overhead to assets ratio. We perform a series 
of t-tests of the null hypothesis that the means derived for our Islamic and conventional bank sample are equal (specifically, we use Satterthwaite tests because 
they allow subsample variances to be different). Wilc-test represents a Wilcoxon rank test which tests the null hypothesis that the two samples are derived from 
different distributions (where normality is not assumed). *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Panel A. Descriptive statistics for bank- and country-level control variables 
 Conventional banks   Islamic banks   t-test 
(p-value) 
Wilc-test 
(p-value) Variables N Mean Median STD 10th  90th  N Mean Median STD 10th  90th  
Efficiency (loan loss provision)  3048 57.12 52.34 23.64 30.03 100 583 76.36 86.15 26.17 36.54 100 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Efficiency (no control for risk) 3334 50.19 44.65 23.9 23.74 93.73 743 70.54 73.35 28.37 27.25 100 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Efficiency (shareholders’ equity) 3334 58.61 54.61 22.6 32.04 100 743 85.11 96.41 19.45 52.76 100 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Tier1 capital  1763 16.91 13.8 11.96 8.5 26.7 526 27.83 18.11 28.16 9.71 60.53 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Capital adequacy  2250 20.23 16.45 13.26 11.26 31.29 583 29.95 19 31.96 11.63 61.98 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Shareholders’ equity  3544 14.58 10.84 13.04 5.25 26.63 869 26.75 15.82 25.78 6.07 73.76 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Maturity match 3484 49.47 33.88 58.04 13.03 92.98 818 74.99 33.95 139.36 11.12 155.43 0.00*** 0.7 
Liquid assets to assets  3534 32.12 26.00 21.76 9.76 65.24 868 27.79 22.27 20.19 6.78 56.44 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Liquid assets to total deposits  2519 37.67 29.46 30.04 11.64 70.7 401 42.72 28.1 55.58 6.89 76.59 0.07* 0.05* 
Size 3544 14.57 14.45 2.03 12.08 17.25 869 13.85 14.07 1.98 11.32 16.31 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Tangibility 3438 1.64 1.05 1.93 0.15 3.64 838 3.45 1.71 6.19 0.11 7.39 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Activity diversification 3459 55.11 57.33 23.75 20.93 84.24 815 56.7 65.04 29 6.93 88.88 0.15 0.00*** 
ROAA 3532 1.2 1.14 2.14 -0.08 3.02 862 1.18 1.16 6.66 -3.01 5.3 0.93 0.47 
CIR 3460 58.15 51.82 35.3 27.76 88.23 793 71.69 51.7 81.35 27.44 98.91 0.00*** 0.08* 
OVERTA 3506 2.44 2.03 1.56 0.83 4.75 857 3.35 2.4 2.59 1.01 6.95 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Legal system 27 0.49 0 0.53 0 1 27 1.02 1 0.5 0 2   
GDP per capita  27 8.82 8.62 1.44 7.05 10.64 27 8.79 8.83 1.41 6.86 10.67   
GDP growth  27 4.02 4.63 3.58 0.12 7.5 27 4.54 5.1 4.08 -1.51 8.34   
Inflation  27 5.84 4.65 5.15 2.03 10.7 27 7.87 5.44 7.88 1.65 17.21   
Panel B. Breakdown of the number of conventional and Islamic banks across 28 countries, over the 2005–2012 period. 
Country Conventional 








banks (# CBs) 
Islamic banks 
(# IBs) 
Algeria 13 1 Kuwait 6 7 Singapore 11 1 
Bahrain  10 17 Lebanon 27 3 Sudan  11 
Bangladesh 20 3 Malaysia 24 15 Syria 5 2 
Brunei 3 1 Maldives 3 1 Tunisia 14 2 
Egypt 21 2 Mauritania 6 1 Turkey 23 3 
Gambia 5 1 Pakistan 21 6 United Arab Emirates 16 10 
Indonesia 62 2 Palestinian territories 3 1 United Kingdom 126 4 
Iraq 4 2 Philippines 25 1 Yemen 4 3 
Iran  10 Qatar 5 3 Total (banks) 477 119 
Jordan 11 3 Saudi Arabia 9 3    
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Table 3  
The effect of higher capital and liquidity on bank efficiency: Islamic vs. conventional banks 
Panel A: The impact of capital ratios on bank efficiency 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 





























      









      
Capital adequacy [ϑCAP] 
 






   
Capital adequacy  
× Islamic [𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] 






   






Shareholders’ equity  
× Islamic [𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] 










































































































































































Obs. 2071 2071 2071 2550 2550 2550 3583 3583 3583 
CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.479 0.507 0.488 0.434 0.47 0.453 0.408 0.435 0.416 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A   18.52***   28.59*** 
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟




















∗ : Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75]  N/A   0.05   0.19 
Panel B:  The impact of liquidity ratios on bank efficiency 
Model # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 



























      









      






   
Liquid assets to assets × 
Islamic [𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] 






   
Liquid assets to total deposits 
[ϑLIQ] 






Liquid assets to total deposits 
× Islamic [𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] 








































































































































Note: This table documents the capital and liquidity determinants of efficiency by comparing Islamic and conventional banks using conditional quantile regressions 
for the period from 2005 to 2012. The dependent variable is pure technical efficiency (loan loss provision). It is computed by comparing banks to their own efficiency 
frontier. BC and CC represent bank level and country level characteristics. CFE and YFE represent country and year fixed effect dummy variables. In addition, we 
include interaction terms between Islamic and the capital and liquidity ratios. We present the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of our dependent variable. Standard errors are 






















Obs. 3576 3576 3576 3577 3577 3577 2560 2560 2560 
CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.384 0.406 0.394 0.331 0.358 0.34 0.389 0.408 0.393 
Wald tests (F-stat.): Q [0.25] = Q [0.75] 2.1   2.65*   N/A 
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟


























The effect of capital and liquidity on bank efficiency: Classification by bank size 
Panel A: The impact of capital ratios on bank efficiency Panel B: The impact of liquidity ratios on bank efficiency 
 Large banks  Small banks  Large banks  Small banks 
Model # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) Model # (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 















































































































Obs. 1404 1404 1404  667 667 667 Obs.  2006 2006 2006  1570 1570 1570 
BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.567 0.589 0.572  0.367 0.403 0.376 R2 0.486 0.515 0.494  0.339 0.374 0.349 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A    N/A ϑLIQ: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.05    2.74* 
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] compared to conventional banks’ efficiency 
[ϑCAP] 
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟



























∗ : Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A    N/A ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















































































































Obs.  1599 1599 1599  951 951 951 Obs.  2006 2006 2006  1571 1571 1571 
BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.539 0.566 0.548  0.32 0.369 0.34 R2  0.474 0.504 0.485  0.275 0.318 0.302 
ϑCAP:  Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 6.65**    13.61*** ϑLIQ: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.34    0.02 
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] compared to conventional banks’ efficiency 
[ϑCAP] 
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟



























∗ : Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.07    0.78 ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟








































































Liquid assets to total 






































Obs.  2009 2009 2009  1574 1574 1574 Obs.  1720 1720 1720  840 840 840 
BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
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(Continued) 
Note: This table documents the capital and liquidity determinants of efficiency by comparing Islamic and conventional banks grouped according to their size using conditional quantile regressions for the period from 2006 to 2012. The 
dependent variable is pure technical efficiency (loan loss provision). It is computed by comparing banks to their own efficiency frontier. BC and CC represent bank level and country level characteristics. CFE and YFE represent country and 
year fixed effect dummy variables. In addition, we include interaction terms between Islamic and the capital and the liquidity ratios. We present the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of our dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the 
bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
  
CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2  0.5 0.537 0.518  0.37 0.398 0.383 R2 0.508 0.523 0.501  0.331 0.358 0.348 
ϑCAP:  Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 12.05***    17.79*** ϑLIQ: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A    12.18*** 
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] compared to conventional banks’ efficiency  
[ϑCAP] 
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟




























∗ :Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.1    1.18 ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟







The effect of capital and liquidity on bank efficiency: high liquidity vs. low liquidity and high capitalization vs. low capitalization banks 
 High liquidity  Low liquidity  Highly capitalized   Low capitalization  
Model # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) Model # (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3) 













































































































Obs. 771 771 771  1300 1300 1300 Obs.  1663 1663 1663  1913 1913 1913 
BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.436 0.474 0.446  0.539 0.562 0.542 R2 0.331 0.353 0.331  0.5 0.53 0.512 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A   7.82*** ϑLIQ:  Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.16    N/A 
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] compared to conventional banks’ efficiency  
[ϑCAP] 
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟


























∗ : Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A    0.07 ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















































































































Obs.  1023 1023 1023  1527 1527 1527 Obs.  1664 1664 1664  1913 1913 1913 
BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.397 0.434 0.402  0.503 0.527 0.51 R2 0.267 0.295 0.266  0.503 0.531 0.515 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A   4.38** ϑLIQ:  Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.57    N/A 
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] compared to conventional banks’ efficiency  
[ϑCAP] 
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟


























∗ : Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A    0.29 ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟








































































Liquid assets to total 






































Obs.  1640 1640 1640  1943 1943 1943 Obs.  1126 1126 1126  1434 1434 1434 
BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes BC & CC Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes CFE & YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.386 0.407 0.395  0.457 0.478 0.46 R2 0.345 0.364 0.347  0.531 0.556 0.537 
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(Continued) 
Note: This table documents the capital and the liquidity determinants of efficiency by comparing Islamic and conventional banks using conditional quantile regressions for the period from 2006 to 2012. We consider two subgroups of banks: 1) 
high liquidity and low liquidity banks, and 2) high capitalization and low capitalization banks. The dependent variable is pure technical efficiency (loan loss provision). It is computed by comparing banks to their own efficiency frontier. BC and 
CC represent bank level and country level characteristics. CFE and YFE represent country and year fixed effect dummy variables.  In addition, we include interaction terms between Islamic and the capital and the liquidity ratios. We present the 
25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of our dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 10.48***    18.17*** ϑLIQ:  Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A    N/A 
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] compared to conventional banks’ efficiency  
[ϑCAP] 
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟


























∗ : Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.25    0.03 ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ : Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A    N/A 
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Table 6 
The effect of capital and liquidity on bank efficiency during the subprime crisis 
Note: This table documents the capital and the liquidity determinants of efficiency by comparing Islamic and conventional banks using conditional quantile regressions 
for the period from 2005 to 2012. The dependent variable is pure technical efficiency (loan loss provision). It is computed by comparing banks to their own efficiency 
frontier. GLOBAL is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the years 2008–2009 and zero otherwise. BC and CC represent bank level and country level characteristics. CFE 
and YFE represent country and year fixed effect dummy variables. We present the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of our dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at 
the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates.  *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
Panel A: The impact of capital ratios on bank efficiency 
 Tier1 capital  Capital adequacy  Shareholders’ equity 
Model  # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 





























































































































































CFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2089 2089 2089  2581 2581 2581  3631 3631 3631 
The impact of capital ratios on bank efficiency during the financial crisis  








































































Panel B:  The impact of liquidity ratios on bank efficiency 
 Maturity match  Liquid assets to assets  Liquid assets to total deposits 
Model  # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 































































































































































CFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3623 3623 3623  3625 3625 3625  2585 2585 2585 
The impact of liquidity ratios on bank efficiency during the financial crisis  










































































The effect of capital and liquidity on bank efficiency during the Arab spring 
Note: This table documents the capital and the liquidity determinants of efficiency by comparing Islamic and conventional banks using conditional quantile regressions 
for the period from 2005 to 2012. The dependent variable is pure technical efficiency (loan loss provision). It is computed by comparing banks to their own efficiency 
frontier. Arab spring is a variable that equals 1 if a country is severely affected by the Arab spring and 0 otherwise. BC and CC represent bank level and country level 
characteristics. CFE and YFE represent country and year fixed effect dummy variables. We present the 25 th, 50th, and 75th quantile of our dependent variable. Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively.
Panel A: The impact of capital ratios on bank efficiency 
 Tier1 capital  Capital adequacy  Shareholders’ equity 
Model  # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 























































































































Islamic × capital ×  







































CFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 2089 2089 2089  2581 2581 2581  3631 3631 3631 
The impact of capital ratios on bank efficiency during the Arab Spring  








































































Panel B:  The impact of liquidity ratios on bank efficiency 
 Maturity match  Liquid assets to assets  Liquid assets to total deposits 
Model  # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) 























































































































Islamic × Liquidity 







































CFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
YFE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 3623 3623 3623  3625 3625 3625  2585 2585 2585 
The impact of liquidity ratios on bank efficiency during the Arab Spring 










































































Other combinations of bank inputs (Models 1-6) and other subsamples (Models 7-12). 
 
 Technical efficiency (shareholders’ 
equity) 
 Technical efficiency (no control for risk)  Technical efficiency (loan loss provision)  
 Full sample  Full sample  Excluding UK  Excluding the UK and Singapore  
Model  # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  












































































ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A    N/A    10.73**    N/A  
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟









































































































ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] N/A    N/A    N/A    N/A  
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟









































































































ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 30.51***    40.62***    0.46    2.64  
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟









































































































ϑLIQ: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 2.06    5.03**    0.45    3.19*  
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟

































Table 8 - (Continued)  
Other combinations for bank inputs and subsamples 
(Continued) 
Note: This table documents the capital and the liquidity determinants of efficiency by comparing Islamic and conventional banks using conditional quantile regressions for the period from 2005 to 2012. The dependent variable is pure technical 
efficiency (loan loss provision) computed by comparing banks to their own efficiency frontier. Models (1) to (3) use shareholders’ equity to control for bank risk in bank input while Models (4) to (6) do not control for risk. Models (7) to (9) re-
estimate efficiency scores (loan loss provision) after excluding the United Kingdom while Models (10) to (12) re-estimate efficiency scores after excluding both the United Kingdom and Singapore from the sample. In this table, we only present 
the main independent variables to save space. BC, CC, CFE, and YFE are included but not reported. We present the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in 
parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 Technical efficiency (shareholders’ equity)  Technical efficiency (no control for risk)  Technical efficiency (loan loss provision)   
 Full sample  Full sample  Excluding UK  Excluding Singapore  
Model  # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  














































































ϑLIQ: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 1.36    10.16***    0.16    0.96  
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
















































































Liquid assets to total 


























ϑLIQ: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 5.11**    N/A    0.06    N/A  
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟



























∗ :  Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.3    N/A    0.29    N/A  
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Table 9 
First difference regressions and other estimation techniques  
Note: This table documents the capital and the liquidity determinants of efficiency by comparing Islamic and conventional banks using three different 
estimation techniques and standard errors. In Models (1) to (3) the dependent variable is the change in the bank efficiency scores. ∆ indicates the first-
difference of the variable between two consecutive years. The estimation is based on conditional quantile regressions with standard errors clustered at the 
bank level. In the rest of the models the dependent variable is pure technical efficiency (loan loss provision). Model (4) uses truncated regressions and 
corrects for the heteroscedasticity of the standard errors using a White procedure. Models (5) and (6) use a random effect, GLS regression with bootstrapped 
standard errors (in Model (5)) and bank level clustered standard errors (in Model (6)). In this table, we only present the main independent variables to save 
space. BC, CC, CFE, and YFE are included but not reported. We present the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of the dependent variable. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
 Quantile 
∆ efficiency (loan loss provision) 




Model  # (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  








































ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.01        
The impact of capital changes on Islamic banks’ efficiency changes [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟























































ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.01        
The impact of capital changes on Islamic banks’ efficiency changes [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟

























































ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.00        
The impact of capital changes on Islamic banks’ efficiency changes [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟























































ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.18        
The impact of liquidity changes on Islamic banks’ efficiency changes [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟

























































ϑCAP: Wald test (p-value): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.18        
The impact of liquidity changes on Islamic banks’ efficiency changes [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟












































∆ Liquid assets to total 














ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 7.49***        
The impact of liquidity changes on Islamic banks’ efficiency changes [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















∗ :   Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 2.22        
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Table 10 
More control variables and IV approach  
 Conditional quantile regressions  IV approach 
 More macro control  One year lag  2SLS  GMM  
Model  # (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7)   Sargan 
(p-value) 
(8)   Hansen's J 
(p-value) Quantile 0.25 0.50 0.75 N 0.25 0.50 0.75 N Coef. N F Coef. N F 














   11.36** 
(5.213) 
   














   -0.327 
(0.316) 
   

















1759 27.89*** 0.168 0.38 
(0.276) 
759 26.79*** 0.182 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 3.13*    3.67*          
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   0.053 
(0.089) 
   
ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   17.4*** 
(4.932) 
   














   0.074 
(0.256) 
   

















2199 27.37*** 0.333 0.03 
(0.230) 
2199 27.37*** 0.324 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 1.22    11.83***          
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   0.107 
(0.076) 
   
ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   30.74*** 
(3.194) 
   














   1.286*** 
(0.235) 
   

















3106 61.71*** 0.125 -0.83*** 
(0.214) 
3106 61.71*** 0.111 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 12.06***    10.14***          
The impact of capital on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   0.451*** 
(0.083) 
   
ϑCAP + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   38.9*** 
(2.757) 
   














   0.436*** 
(0.061) 
   

















3368 30.45*** 0.336 -0.39*** 
(0.061) 
3368 30.45*** 0.364 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 9.93***    0.21          
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   0.048*** 
(0.008) 
   
ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   209.7*** 
(62.01) 
   














   6.657*** 
(2.197) 
   
Liquid assets to assets (-1)  -0.544* -0.349* -0.178 1918 -0.1 0.026 -0.138 2722 -6.18*** 3370 4.59** 0.733 -6.23*** 3370 4.6*** 0.757 
53 
(Continued) 
Note: This table documents the capital and the liquidity determinants of efficiency by comparing Islamic and conventional banks. In Models (1) to (3) we add more control variables while in Models (4) to (6) we lag capital and liquidity 
ratios by one year. We also use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to control for endogeneity; in Model (7) we use the two-stage least squares method (2SLS) while in Model (8) we use the generalized method of moments (GMM). 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank level in Models (1) to (6) are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. In this table, we only present the main independent variables to save space. BC, CC, CFE, and YFE are 
included but not reported. We present the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
× Islamic [𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ ] (0.279) (0.206) (0.110) (0.109) (0.126) (0.102) (2.045) (2.054) 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 3.74*    0.41          
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   0.43** 
(0.186) 
   
ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   53.35*** 
(4.361) 
   
















   0.759*** 
(0.109) 
   
Liquid assets to total deposits 
















2424 39.98*** 0.586 -0.72*** 
(0.114) 
2424 39.98*** 0.595 
ϑCAP: Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.14    0.48          
The impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ efficiency [ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟















   0.04 
(0.038) 
   
ϑLIQ + 𝜗𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟
∗ :  Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.15    0.16          
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Table 11  
The effect of higher capital and liquidity on bank efficiency using a common efficiency frontier 
 Common efficiency frontier (loan loss provision)  
 Full sample  Excluding UK  Excluding Singapore  
Model  # (1) (2) (3)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12)  





























































ϑCAP: Wald test (p-value): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 2.14    N/A    N/A  


















































































ϑCAP: Wald test (p-value): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 15.96***    N/A    N/A  


















































































ϑCAP: Wald test (p-value): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 14.61***    9.84***    12.88***  


















































































ϑLIQ: Wald test (p-value): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.34    3.15*    6.09**  





















































































ϑLIQ: Wald test (p-value): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75]  0.15    9.37***    10.1***  






























































Liquid assets to total 





















ϑLIQ: Wald test (p-value): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 1.04    N/A    N/A  





















∗ :  Wald test (F-stat.): Q[0.25] = Q[0.75] 0.17    N/A    N/A  
(Continued) 
Note: This table documents the capital and the liquidity determinants of efficiency by comparing Islamic and conventional banks using conditional quantile regressions for the period from 2005 to 
2012. The dependent variable is pure technical efficiency (loan loss provision) computed by comparing banks to a common efficiency frontier. All models use loan loss provision to control for 
bank risk in bank input. Models (7) to (9) re-estimate efficiency scores (loan loss provision) after excluding the United Kingdom while Models (10) to (12) re-estimate efficiency scores after 
excluding both the United Kingdom and Singapore from the sample. In this table, we only present the main independent variables to save space. BC, CC, CFE, and YFE are included but not 
reported. We present the 25th, 50th, and 75th quantile of the dependent variable. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and are reported in parentheses below their coefficient estimates. *, 
























Figure 1. Unconditional distribution of the dependent variable. The solid 
green line represents a normal distribution while the red dashed line 























Figure 2. Distribution of standard errors. The thin blue line represents a 
normal distribution of standard errors while the thick blue line represents 
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Variable definitions and data sources  
Variable Definition Data Source 
Efficiency model 
Outputs of banks 
Total loans Loans and total other lending (US$ thousands) Bankscope 
Other earning 
assets 
Total other earning assets (US$ thousands) Bankscope 
Other operating 
income 
Other operating income (US$ thousands) Bankscope 
Inputs of banks  
Deposits and short 
term funding  
The sum of deposits and short term funding (US$ thousands) Bankscope 
Fixed assets Fixed assets (US$ thousands) Bankscope 
Overheads Overhead (US$ thousands) Bankscope 
Loan loss 
provision  
Loan loss provisions (US$ thousands) Bankscope 
Dependent variable   
Efficiency Bank pure technical efficiency, ranging between 0 and 100. It is calculated by comparing each bank 
category (i.e. Islamic and conventional banks) to its own efficiency frontier. Efficiency includes 
loan loss provisions to control for risk 
Authors’ calculations 
Independent variables  
Regulatory variables 
1. Capital ratios 
Capital adequacy The capital adequacy ratio. It is the sum of bank Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital as a percentage of risk 
weighted assets. This includes subordinated debt, hybrid capital, loan loss reserves, and valuation 
reserves as a percentage of risk weighted assets and off-balance sheet risks. This ratio must be 




Tier 1 capital Similar to the capital adequacy ratio. This measure of capital adequacy measures Tier 1 capital 
divided by risk weighted assets computed under the Basel rules. Banks must maintain a minimum 






The traditional leverage ratio measured as the ratio of equity to assets times 100. Bankscope 
2. Liquidity ratios 
Maturity match The ratio of liquid assets to deposits and short term funding. It measures and assesses the sensitivity 
to bank runs; therefore, it promotes financial soundness, but it can also be interpreted as excess of 
liquidity coverage. 
Bankscope 
Liquid assets to 
assets 
The ratio of liquid assets to total assets. The ratio measures assets that are easily convertible to cash 
at any time and without any constraints. 
Bankscope 
Liquid assets to 
total deposits  
The ratio of liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing. Similar to the liquid assets to deposit and 
short term funding ratio, this ratio considers the amount of liquid assets available not only for 
depositors but also for borrowers. 
Bankscope 
Control variables 
Bank control variables 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets Bankscope 
Tangibility  The ratio of bank fixed assets to total assets times 100 Bankscope 
Activity 
diversification 
The share of bank net loans in total earning assets times 100 Bankscope 
ROAA The profitability ratio is a measure of bank profitability at the operational level. It reports the 
amount of a bank’s net income divided by average total assets times 100. 
Bankscope 
CIR The share of bank costs to bank income before provisions times 100 Bankscope 
OVERTA The percentage of bank overhead to total assets   
Country control variables 
GDP per capita The natural logarithm of GDP per capita World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
GDP growth Growth rate of GDP World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Inflation Inflation rate, based on changes in the consumer price index World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
LEGAL A variable that takes on a value of 0 if a country does not apply Shari’a rules in its legal system, a 
value of 1 if Shari’a law and other legal systems are considered, and a value of 2 if Shari’a is the 
only accepted law 
The CIA World Fact 
Book 
GLOBAL A dummy variable that equals 1 for the years 2008 and 2009 and 0 otherwise Authors’ calculation 
Arab Spring A dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is affected by the Arab Spring and 0 otherwise Ghosh (2016), Bitar 
et al. (2017b)  









Table A2  
Correlation matrix 
a, b, and c represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 16 17 18 19 
(1) Tier1 capital 1.00                 
(2) Capital adequacy 0.98c 1.00                
(3) Shareholders’ equity 0.69c 0.67c 1.00               
(4) Maturity match 0.47c 0.48c 0.62c 1.00              
(5) Liquid assets to 
assets 
0.34c 0.33c 0.20c 0.51c 1.00             
(6) Liquid assets to total 
deposits 
0.42c 0.49c 0.56 c 0.74 c 0.78 c 1.00            
(7) Size -0.42 c -0.38 c -0.46 c -0.27 c -0.26 c -0.26 c 1.00           
(8) Tangibility  0.17 c 0.11 c 0.27 c 0.11 c -0.07 c -0.03a -0.31 c 1.00          
(9) Loans to earning 
assets 
-0.25 c -0.24 c -0.17 c -0.38 c -0.59 c -0.46 c 0.19 c -0.10 c 1.00         
(10) ROAA 0.00 0.03 0.11 c -0.08 c -0.03b -0.06 c 0.02 -0.08 c 0.10 c 1.00        
(11) CIR 0.20 c 0.17 c 0.16 c 0.16 c 0.08 c 0.13 c -0.26 c 0.23 c -0.18 c -0.52 c 1.00       
(12) OVERTA 0.22 c 0.19 c 0.34 c 0.17 c -0.06 c 0.02 -0.43 c 0.46 c -0.03b -0.10 c 0.45 c 1.00      
(13) Efficiency (LLP)  0.05b 0.09 c 0.21 c 0.19 c 0.02 0.05b 0.27 c -0.17 c -0.02 0.18 c -0.20 c -0.24 c 1.00     
(16) Legal system 0.05b 0.01 0.05b -0.04b -0.17 c -0.10 c 0.03b 0.16 c 0.16 c 0.07 c -0.10 c -0.04b 0.09 c 1.00    
(17) GDP per capita 0.09 c 0.07b 0.15 c 0.09 c 0.14 c 0.14 c 0.29 c -0.24 c -0.06 c -0.01 -0.03 -0.23 c 0.38 c -0.32 c 1.00   
(18) GDP growth 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.06 c -0.11 c -0.07 c -0.01 0.01 0.10 c 0.15 c -0.12 c -0.02 -0.03a 0.16 c -0.21 c 1.00  
(19) Inflation -0.09 c -0.06 c -0.07 c -0.07 c -0.12 c -0.12 c -0.08 c 0.19 c 0.05b 0.05b 0.01 0.12 c -0.14 c 0.25 c -0.41 c -0.06 c 1.00 
